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ABSTRACT

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF SMALLHOLDER
INCORPORATION AND LAND ACQUISITION
SEPTEMBER 2016
ALFREDO R. ROSETE
B.S., B.A., LOYOLA UNIVERSITY CHICAGO
M.S., LOYOLA UNIVERSITY CHICAGO
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professor James K. Boyce and Professor Ceren Soylu

Of late, development institutions and economists have argued that one way
to accomplish the modernisation, and thus, poverty alleviation in the rural sector
is through smallholder incorporation- partnerships between agribusiness firms and
smallholders in order to cultivate high valued export crops. Smallholders in developing
countries often face numerous challenges that result in low incomes, and limited opportunities. As a result of these challenges, smallholders in developing countries continue to cultivate subsistence crops, or, use less technologically intensive techniques.
Thus, many are unable to maximize the use of their holdings. Agribusiness firms may
provide the material inputs, infrastructure, and transport needed for smallholders to
overcome these challenges, and thus, expand their income earning capacities.
However, case studies by development scholars, and civil society organizations have
identified instances where agribusiness partnerships result in low incomes and even the
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effective dispossession of smallholders. Further, empirical studies find that agribusiness firms tend to target countries that have little regard for local land rights. What
explains these outcomes? How does the process of contracting between smallholders
and agribusiness firms result in smallholders ceding rights to their land? Under what
conditions do investors prefer to locate in countries with little regard for smallholder
land? The three essays of this dissertation seek to answer these questions.
The first essay uses a field investigation among Agrarian Reform Beneficiaries
(ARBs) in the Davao Region of the Philippines to identify factors that compel smallholders to accept partnerships where they effectively cede control over land to investors. The second essay formalizes the contracting process between smallholders
and investors in a game-theoretic model where contracts are defined by a degree of
control over land. The third essay employs a game-theoretic model to identify conditions under which investors would prefer environments that offer little protections
for local land rights.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

Agrarian issues have received a good deal of treatment in the economics of development, and one of the most prescient problems is that of modernising agriculture so
as to raise the income, welfare, and opportunities for those who live and work on the
rural sectors of developing nations. Of late, development institutions (see e.g. Mondiale, 2008) and economists (see e.g. Reardon and Barrett, 2000; Cook and Chaddad,
2000) have argued that one way to accomplish the modernisation, and thus, poverty
alleviation in the rural sector is for smallholders to partner with agribusiness firms in
order to cultivate high valued export crops.
There are two reasons why such partnerships can help in achieving rural development. In a macroeconomic sense, such partnerships can create agglomeration advantages and integrate the agricultural sector to other sectors in the economy. Cultivating export crops entails physical inputs such as machinery for land conversion,
and construction materials for processing plants. Further, these crops often have to
follow stringent quality standards, creating the need for specific fertilizers and pesticides. Finally, export crops need transport and shipping to arrive in their destination
markets. When smallholders partner with agribusiness investors, sectors such as shipping, construction, and chemical manufacturing can provide such auxiliary services,
and thus, form linkages with the rural sector. Partnerships with agribusiness firms
can also bring microeconomic benefits. Smallholders in developing countries often
face numerous challenges that result in low incomes, and limited opportunities. One
such challenge is constraints in the wealth of smallholders. While, often, smallholders
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either own or have use-rights to land, they may not have the ability to collateralize
their holdings due to existing property rights institutions (De Soto et al., 2003). Further, these wealth constraints may be compounded by the existence of monopolistic
credit markets that prevent them from accessing sufficient funds for fertilizer, irrigation, and other material inputs (Besley, 1994). Another such challenge is their ability
to access markets. The lack of transport technology, refrigeration, or even farm-tomarket roads hinder smallholders from accessing markets where they may gain better
prices for their crops (see e.g. Hallam, 2011; Shami, 2012). As a result of these challenges, smallholders in developing countries continue to cultivate subsistence crops,
or, use less technologically intensive techniques. Thus, many are unable to maximize
the use of their holdings. Agribusiness firms may provide the material inputs, infrastructure, and transport needed for smallholders to overcome these challenges, and
thus, expand their income earning capacities.
This dissertation focuses on the supposed microeconomic benefits of agribusiness partnerships, or what I term smallholder incorporation. Of late, case studies
by development scholars (White et al., 2012), and civil society organizations (see e.g.
Colchester et al., 2011; IBON, 2013) have identified instances where agribusiness partnerships result in low incomes and even the effective dispossession of smallholders.
Further, a series of articles by Deininger (2011), Deininger (2013), and Arezki et al.
(2013) find that agribusiness firms tend to target countries that have little regard for
local land rights. What explains these outcomes? How does the process of contracting
between smallholders and agribusiness firms result in smallholders ceding rights to
their land? Under what conditions do investors prefer to locate in countries with little
regard for smallholder land? The three essays of this dissertation seek to answer these
questions.
The first essay uses a field investigation among Agrarian Reform beneficiaries
(ARBs) in the Davao Region of the Philippines to identify factors that compel small-
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holders to accept partnerships where they effectively cede control over land to investors. The second essay formalizes the contracting process between smallholders
and investors in a game-theoretic model where contracts are defined by a degree of
control over land. The third essay employs a game-theoretic model to identify conditions under which investors would prefer environments that offer little protections
for local land rights.
These essays make three contributions to the literature on smallholder incorporation and land acquisition. First, I conduct a comparative study of smallholder incorporation among Agrarian Reform Beneficiaries (ARBs) in the Philippines. There
have been other studies from the Philippines focusing on the new class configurations that occur in communities that have undergone agrarian reform (see e.g. Adam,
2013). My study identifies factors of bargaining which lead to differential outcomes
of incorporation in terms of their income and well-being. A second contribution that
I make is a model of contracting that conceptualizes ownership structure as a continuum rather than a discrete category. By doing so, I am able to show how effective
dispossession of smallholders can occur even under a consensual partnership. Finally,
I use a game theoretic model which situates the observed behaviors of agribusiness
firms within the literature of location choice by investors, situating the problem of
land acquisitions within the microeconomics of international investment. This essay
also demonstrates how power -given by ability to dispossess- can become a factor in
attracting investments.

3

CHAPTER 2
PROPERTY, POSSESSION, INCORPORATION:
AGRIBUSINESS VENTURE AGREEMENTS IN THE
PHILIPPINES

2.1

Introduction

Of late, incorporating smallholder land through partnerships with agribusiness
firms that cultivate export crops has received some attention among scholars, policymakers and non-government organizations (NGOs). Some see such partnerships as
a means of raising smallholder incomes, and achieving rural development (see, e.g.
Mondiale, 2008; Robertson and Pinstrup-Andersen, 2010; Cramb and Curry, 2012).
This is because agribusiness firms can introduce new technologies, provide capital
inputs, and link smallholders to markets for their crops. Others have not shown the
same enthusiasm. The literature reports cases of smallholders losing the ability to use
their holdings and receiving only poverty-level remuneration (Hall, 2011; Colchester
et al., 2011).
Many observers attribute the adverse outcomes of smallholder incorporation to
governance institutions that are complicit to coercive activity (see e.g. Borras Jr et al.,
2010). Few have discussed how even consensual transactions can deprive smallholders
of the ability to determine who can use their lands and how (see e.g. Wilson, 1986).
This essay examines factors that influence smallholders’ decisions in choosing the
structure of their partnerships with agribusiness firms. I argue that the very economic
problems which agribusiness partnerships are meant to alleviate may themselves force
smallholders to accept contracts where they lose rights to their land. I do this by
first showing how one can disentangle property rights and control over an asset, and
4

that the choice of a structure of incorporation (or business model) is an exchange of
control over land. Thus, it is possible for investors to effectively dispossess smallholders
despite their possession of formal property rights. I will then illustrate this dynamic
using a field investigation among agrarian reform beneficiaries (ARB’s) in the Davao
region of the Philippines.
This paper aims to make two contributions to the literature on agribusiness incorporation. First, I introduce a framework for analyzing agribusiness contracts by
understanding what provisions deprive smallholders of effective control over their
lands. Second, I conduct a comparative study of agribusiness projects with ARBs in
the Philippines to analyze the political and economic conditions that give rise to different contractual types. To my knowledge, past studies of agribusiness partnerships
among this population have drawn conclusions from singular cases, or have used several cases to illustrate resulting political-economic transformations without examining
reasons for the variations in contract types. This paper uses multiple case studies to
illustrate how debt, the risk of losing land, and lack of information on alternative
contract types inform a smallholder’s decisions in choosing a contract. These similar
factors have been shown to influence smallholders’ choices in various international
contexts (see e.g. Cramb and Curry, 2012; Jiwan, 2013).
The essay is arranged as follows. Section 4.2 discusses current issues that arise
from smallholder incorporation, drawing from economic theory and the literature on
agrarian political economy. Section 4.3 discusses the issue of property rights and
contracting in economic theory. I outline a framework for disentangling possession
or control from property rights using insights from legal theory and institutional
economics. I then apply it to a typical taxonomy of business models or “structures
of Incorporation". Section 2.4 introduces smallholder incorporation in the specific
context of post-land-reform policies in the Philippines, and discusses the field work.
Section 2.5 presents the results of the field investigation. I begin by summarizing
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the historical experiences of different ARB groups that I interviewed, focusing on
economic and socio-political challenges they faced in making their contract choices. I
then discuss what these conditions mean for the resulting degree of control over their
holdings specified in their contracts, and what these contracts meant for their income
and well-being. The final section discusses policy implications of these findings.

2.2

Smallholder Incorporation

Economic literature considers two broad channels through which agribusiness incorporation can yield benefits for smallholders. The first are macroeconomic channels directed toward rural development (Cook and Chaddad, 2000). Agribusiness
incorporation can establish linkages between farm and non-farm sectors through the
cultivation of non-traditional crops. In a setting where subsistence crops are widely
cultivated, links to other sectors may be weak or absent. Often, agribusiness firms
cultivate crops for export rather than food or subsistence. To ensure that these crops
are marketable, it is necessary to coordinate transport, refrigeration, processing mills
and other upstream market links. Further links can also come through input markets
such as fertilizers, machinery, and construction for building necessary infrastructure
on land. In this way, agribusiness investment can generate agglomeration advantages
with complementary industries, especially where agribusiness clusters form. Finally,
agribusiness investment can also allow a country to benefit from inflows of foreign
direct investment (FDI) (Reardon and Barrett, 2000).
The second channel by which agribusiness incorporation can bring improvements
for smallholders is in improving opportunities for smallholders to use their lands as
a viable source of income. Smallholders face challenges in both access to inputs, and
access to markets for their crops. Both of these can restrict their income generating opportunities. Monopolistic creditors who can charge high interest rates often dominate
rural credit markets. If such creditors are the only source of credit to purchase inputs
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for cultivation, smallholders face higher costs of investing in their holdings (see e.g.
Hoff and Stiglitz, 1990; Besley, 1994; Ghosh and Ray, 2016). The lack of infrastructure
such as roads (Shami, 2012), high transport costs, and lack of necessary technologies
such as refrigeration (Barrett et al., 2012) create difficulties for smallholders in accessing markets, leading to spoilage and crop damage. As a result smallholders may have
to depend on monopsonistic or oligopsonistic buyers who have the means to bring
their crops to market. Agribusiness investment can relieve these constraints through
providing capital for inputs and/ or outlets for smallholder produce. Agribusiness
partnerships that provide smallholders with capital relieve investment constraints for
smallholders. Further, partnerships guaranteeing access to transport or buying crops
can reduce the risks associated with marketing (Wang et al., 2014).
Considering the possibilities of agribusiness partnerships for rural development
and poverty reduction, policy-makers and state actors in the global south have taken
measures to attract and legitimize such ventures through development plans and
guidelines (German et al., 2016). In some cases, governments have facilitated the
process of agribusiness incorporation by identifying appropriate sites for agribusiness investors and negotiating with smallholders (Colchester et al., 2011). Identifying
appropriate sites and smallholders who have the ability to cultivate crops can alleviate some uncertainty by enhancing the quality of information that investors have
regarding the potential profitability of their partnerships.
Some scholars point out, however, that actions of states may result in adverse outcomes from smallholder incorporation. Some case studies suggest that states sometimes adjust environmental and labor standards in order to make the prospect of
locating in their country more lucrative (Jiwan, 2013). Agribusiness investment may
also appeal to local government actors that have influence over smallholder communities through historic and kinship ties. These actors may use their influence over
communities to convince or coerce them into incorporation (Lavers, 2012). Trends in
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land acquisitions further corroborate case studies of agribusiness firms taking advantage of weak protections for smallholders (Borras Jr and Franco, 2013). Empirical
studies by Deininger (2011), Deininger (2013), and Arezki et al. (2013) yield evidence
that agribusiness investors are attracted to countries that have weak protections for
local land rights.
While the actions of states may play a significant role in determining the outcomes
of agribusiness incorporation, these are not sufficient to explain adverse outcomes.
Social and economic circumstances may force smallholders into contracts where they
are completely dispossessed of their lands even without the actions of the state. To
understand how this can occur one needs to consider two configurations of property
rights. The first are property rights ex ante that form the foundations for contracting
by providing a supposedly secure basis for the exchange of assets. The second is the
configuration of property rights ex post- the resulting configuration of rights and
privileges which determine each partner’s control over land.

2.3

Property, Possession and Structures of Incorporation

Well-defined property rights are among the bases for partners to contract. Secure
property rights can minimize the risks of losing an asset that is used in production,
or, the risks of losing crops (Ghatak and Besley, 2010; Auerbach and Azariadis, 2015).
Insecurity can also create frictions through the credit channel, by reducing the collateral value of an asset and preventing the asset holder from gaining access to credit
(Besley et al., 2012). When property rights are secure, partners to a contract can
ensure that their investments are safe. Secure, well-defined property rights do not
mean, however, that an asset holder will have control once the contract is in force.
Contracts also reassign certain abilities to each partner which can determine who
effectively controls land.
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In economic literature, partners to a contract choose a structure of incorporation or
business model, to overcome information asymmetries in the allocation of inputs such
as labor and capital (Das, 1999), asymmetric bargaining power (Schmitz, 2013a) and
other uncertainties introduced by laws, culture and norms (see, e.g. Che and Facchini,
2009). The firm structure is sometimes modelled as a structure of compensation where
the investor decides to offer either a share of profits, a purchasing price for the product,
or a fixed payment. Others model an ownership structure as the ability of one partner
to take control of the firm and its assets (Grossman and Hart, 1986; Antràs, 2014). In
the context of agribusiness, some have pointed out how structures of incorporation can
displace decision making rights from farmer/ smallholder to processors or investors
(Key and Runsten, 1999; Reardon et al., 2000). Among possible rights exchanged
in a contract are the ability to exclude others from the use of land, and the ability
to determine how the land is used. Such an allocation of rights constitutes a level
of control that is different from the ex-ante property rights that allowed contracting
to take place. For example, a smallholder may have been able to decide what crops
are cultivated on her holding before entering a partnership. However, a contract may
stipulate that she can only cultivate one crop, thus, reassigning the ability to decide
how the land is used. These decision-making rights in turn may affect the income and
benefits that smallholders can obtain from a partnership (Cotula and Leonard, 2010).
One can disentangle control and property rights by recognizing that property
rights are a set of abilities that someone has over an object or an asset (Cole, 2002;
Glackin, 2014; Hodgson, 2015). In smallholder incorporation, a list of rights or abilities
over land that are exchanged in a contract are listed as follows:
• Determine User- The ability to determine who can work on the land, or who
is able to till and harvest. This may extend to who can be employed under the
partnership.
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• Withdraw -Determine the duration of the partnership, or having the option to
withdraw land.
• Determine Use- Determine what is planted, or being able to determine whether
crops will be changed.
• Determine Methods-Determine how crops are cultivated including types of fertilizer and materials used.
Table 2.1 shows the differences among three broad contract types which are widely
used in smallholder incorporation (Cooke et al., 2012; Cramb and Curry, 2012) in
terms of Remuneration, and Control (De la Cruz, 2012). Remuneration refers to the
income or sources of income that each partner gets from the transaction. Control refers
to the abilitities that a contract confers to each partner. We can think of lease and
growership contracts as two extremes. Under a lease contract, the smallholder forfeits
all control over her land, and most production decisions. In the growership contract,
the investor acts as a buyer of the smallholderâĂŹs crops, while the smallholder makes
most of the decisions on how to cultivate, what methods to use, and whom to employ.
However, the investor can use monitoring mechanisms such as checking the state of
crops, restricting the types of fertilizers used, and consulting with smallholders to
ensure crop delivery. In between these two extremes are what I broadly call joint
ventures. The decision rights that are traded in such intermediary contracts differ
considerably. Some joint ventures are framed as management contracts where the
investor advises and monitors cultivation. Others are arranged so that the investor
builds necessary infrastructure, and then transfers these to smallholders for a share
of the profits. In this case, the division of control is temporal. During the building
period, the investor may have all the decision-making power. After that, he may act
as a consultant to a growership.

10
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Profit-share

↑
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Joint
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Table 2.1: Different contract types and the allocation of abilities. Arrows are meant to show that Joint ventures are an
intermediary form of contract.Italics are meant to indicate an ability shared by each partner. Entries under control show who
holds each ability. Either the Smallholder, Investor, Jointly held to some degree.

The distribution of rights affects the benefits that smallholders get from the partnership. For example, if an agribusiness firm can control what fertilizers are used
which may introduce additional expenses for smallholders. This can occur growership
arrangements or in joint ventures as part of a quality control mechanism. In some
cases, smallholders may retain the ability to work on their lands, giving them another
source of income. Smallholder communities may also delineate certain parcels of land
to raise food crops or build housing.
What factors contribute to how partners bargain over the allocation of rights and
a firm structure? The first of these would be economic factors- whether a smallholder
has access to credit, whether they are able to transport their crops to markets, or
whether they are able to afford fertilizers and materials for building infrastructure.
The second set are socio-political forces such as the laws governing contract regulations, organizations of smallholders, and the degree to which smallholders can give
free, prior, and informed consent (FPIC) regarding the differences and advantages
of investment contracts (German et al., 2013). The ability of smallholders to obtain
proper information regarding contracts, and to refuse these contracts, depends on
power-relations between smallholders, governments, and investors. An investor who
has developed connections with state actors, for example, can influence how governing
bodies weigh their interests against the interests of smallholders (Nolte and VogetKleschin, 2014). The experiences of ARBs in the Philippines illustrate how these
factors influence how contracts are formed to generate incomes and the distribution
of control rights over land.

2.4

Land Reform and Agribusiness Incorporation in the Philippines

The Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) of the Philippines was
passed in 1987 after a protest in which thirteen peasant farmers were killed in a mo-
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bilization for land reform now known as the Mendiola Massacre. The stated objectives
of land reform have not changed since its beginnings: To achieve "a more equitable
distribution of land" founded on "the right of farmers and regular farmworkers, to
own directly or collectively the lands they till, or, in the case of other farmworkers, to
receive a just share of the fruits thereof"(Republic of The Philippines, 2009, Chapter
1, Section 2.).
Under CARP, once a person becomes an ARB and receives a Certificate of Landownership Award (CLOA), he/she has to pay an annual amortization for the land within
a given time window. There is not a precise formula for payments, but the price takes
into account the land’s real estate value (proximity to roads, water, etc), and the value
of standing crops, as well as the avowed valuation of the former landownerRepublic of
The Philippines (2009, Chapter 6, Section 17). An ARB is entitled to use the holdings,
change its use, and appropriate the gains from its use. However, in keeping with the
intent of the law, the ARB cannot sell the awarded holding for a period of ten years
after receiving the CLOA. The implementation of CARP began in 1988 and expired
in 2012 after several renewals. Today there is a debate in the Philippine Congress of
whether land reform should continue, or whether CARP can be left as it is with over
80% of its intended area of redistribution accomplished (IBON, 2013).
Soon after the implementation of CARP, it was observed that smallholders were
entering into leasing and growership contracts with agribusiness investors. Recognizing their potential benefits, the Philippine government sought to encourage these
arrangements, attempting to put in place regulations that would ensure ARB welfare
under such contracts (Department of Agrarian Reform, 2006). These arrangements
were termed Agribusiness Venture Agreements (AVAs). The official definition of an
AVA is an "entrepreneurial collaboration between ARBs and private investors to implement an agribusiness venture on lands distributed under CARP"(Department of
Agrarian Reform, 1996). Through these agreements, ARBs can access upstream mar-
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kets, gain access to capital, and use farming technology1 . The Department of Agrarian
Reform (DAR) can monitor AVAs, since local government units keep files of CLOAs,
and, at least in principle, the contracts that ARBs and agribusiness entities sign.
In a 2010 report released by the Philipines’ Inter-Agency Committee (a collection of government agencies that also includes the National Economic Development Authority, NEDA) AVAs cover approximately 1.2 million hectares(cited by
IBON, 2013). The large disparity between this figure, and DARâĂŹs official list of
50,103 hectares was acknowledged when I spoke to the DAR authorities. When I had
quoted the DAR’s figure, one of them quipped: “Parang dito lang yata, ganyan na
kadami"(“Maybe in this Province alone, there’s already that many".). They said they
were still catching up with listing all AVAs. If the quoted figure of 1.2 million hectares
is correct, then, AVAs cover 29.64% of all CARP lands as of 2009 and 12.41% of total
agricultural land.2
The optimism of agrarian reform officials regarding the development potential of
AVAs, however, was not widely shared by land reform advocates. In recent years,
scholars have compiled cases of AVAs resulting in adverse outcomes for ARBs. Some
examples are found in the work of Borras (2007), Menguita-Feranil (2013), and Adam
(2013) who show how ARBs in certain areas of the country are compelled to accept contracts which leave them with neither control over land or income from its
use. These reports point to the dangers inherent in AVAs. CARP redistributes land
but does not address the existing social conditions that render owner cultivatorship difficult for ARBs. Conditions such as poverty and lack of farm-to-market roads
leave ARBs vulnerable to rural creditors, fertilizer merchants, and produce buyers.
1

The full set of justifications can be found in the Administrative Order 09-06 from the Department
of Agrarian Reform
2

CARP accomplishments at 2009 were at 4,049,016.71 has. and the countryâĂŹs total agricultural land is at 9.671 million has.
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Agribusiness investors are able to take advantage of such situations to lock ARBs into
highly unfavorable contracts that can last for decades.
This is not to say that AVAs do not have their share of success. The DAR has compiled several cases where AVAs have resulted in ARBs being able to escape poverty,
buy homes, and even diversify into businesses outside of agriculture. The cited factors that contribute to favorable contracts are numerous. These include organizing
among ARBs, and being able to access credit (Department of Agrarian Reform, 2006).
How such factors influence the process of contracting, and which of these had greater
weight in the decision-making processes of ARBs, was the focus in my field work.
Though ARBs do not constitute all smallholders in the Philippines, in general,
they have several advantages as beneficiaries of the agrarian reform program. First,
their Certificates of Land Ownership Award (CLOA) are filed with the Department
of Agrarian Reform. Second, the DAR, in theory, is supposed to monitor their wellbeing, and how they use the holdings they have been awarded. Finally, there are
municipal and provincial agrarian reform offices in which the ARBs can ask for assistance in contract disputes. In these respects, the ARBs have the advantage of some
institutional backing that other smallholders do not. Yet, despite these institutional
advantages, ARBs have had divergent experiences in their agribusiness deals. If so,
the difficulties they face may also apply to agribusiness incorporation throughout the
country.

2.4.1

The Field Work

In 2015, I conducted field work in the Davao Region of the Philippines, covering
seven groups of ARBs located in three different locales, and two different provinces.3 I
targeted ARBs who have entered into AVAs involved in the cultivation of Cavendish
bananas. Cavendish bananas are one of the chief export crops of the Philippines
3

See Figure 2.1 for a map.
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worth $884 million annually, or 14% of the country’s total agricultural exports. The
Philippines is 3rd largest exporter of Cavendish bananas after India and China. The
total land area devoted to Cavendish banana cultivation in the country is 82,202 ha.
The Davao region cultivates 46,681 of these (56.78%). In the DAR’s official tally,
AVAs that are devoted to the cultivation of Cavendish bananas account for 8,717
ha. Thus, the listed AVAs account for 18.7 % of land area devoted to Cavendish
banana cultivation in the region, and 10.6% of land area devoted to Cavendish banana
cultivation in the Philippines4 .
By choosing one crop, I control for differences in prices, farming techniques, and
necessary technologies. Comparing Cavendish banana farms to another crop such as
maize (often grown for ethanol) would be difficult, since the fixed costs of cultivating
Cavendish bananas are different. Before a farmer cultivates Cavendish bananas, she
must first dig a system of hills and canals. Each hill needs several propping poles
made from metal or bamboo to ensure that the trees do not fall once they bear
fruit. Planting is done in such a way that each tree yields fruit every 13 weeks. After
ten months, the first of the trees bear fruit, and farmers can harvest these. If done
properly, a hectare may have up to 1,000 trees. A farmer can harvest the equivalent
of 143 boxes of class A Cavendish bananas every week, fetching a bi-weekly gross
income of as high as 27,000 pesos ($ 587).5
Growers, however, have several expenses. First, Cavendish bananas are chemicaland fertilizer-intensive. Fertilizers can cost up to 990 pesos per 50 kg sack. Under
typical growing methods, a hectare of banana uses up to 3 sacks of fertilizer every
20 days. The farmer must also treat the trees by applying chemicals to guard against
4

These figures were taken from estimates of the Philippines’ Bureau of Agricultural Statistics,
www.bas.gov.ph
5

Class A Cavendish Bananas have a length of between 7.5-12 inches (19.05cm-30.48cm), with a
girth of around 2 inches (5.08cm). The calculation of the 27,000 pesos is based on the price that an
independent grower can obtain had she not entered an exclusive growership contract
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Figure 2.1: The Field Site
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fungi and other pests that may prevent the crop from meeting export standards. A
typical grower pays for chemicals delivered through aerial-spraying on a bi-weekly
basis. The farmer must also buy twine for propping up the banana plants, and plastic
bags to wrap new bunches and protect them against insects. Finally, the farmer must
also supply or pay for labor. Typically, the total bi-weekly cost of cultivating bananas
is 9,646 pesos ($ 210) per hectare.6 Thus, the net income from a hectare of cavendish
bananas is about 17,354 pesos ($ 377).
I asked each ARB group for a list of their members with addresses, went house
to house, and also visitied places that were frequented by ARBs.7 Three of the ARB
groups decided to host me in their offices to conduct interviews there. I interviewed
71 individual ARBs and held focus groups with four of the seven groups I interviewed.8 Focus group sizes varied. In the municipality of Santo Tomas, Davao Del
Norte, I interviewed members of five ARB groups in total. All were workers for the
Marsman-Drysdale Enterprises Plantation Incorporated (MEPI), a company founded
by a Dutch venture capitalist (Marsman), sold to an American (Drysdale), and is
now co-owned by Filipino backers. In 1998, the MEPI plantation in Santo Tomas was
distributed to its 1,109 workers. Two of these groups currently have growership contracts with Sumitomo Fruit Company (SUMIFRU). These are the Marsman Agrarian
Reform Beneficiaries Cooperative (MARBCO) and the Marsman Individual Farmers
Agrarian Reform Beneficiaries Cooperative (MIFARBCO). The landholdings of the

6

I gathered these cost figures by going to the three agricultural supply stores for prices of twine,
fertilizer, chemicals, and plastic bags. I checked my figures with farm managers from three of the
seven groups I interviewed. I then interviewed independent aerial spray providers, and noted how
much each group I interviewed payed for tis item. Finally, I also checked my figures with pay receipts
provided by one of the growers I interviewed.
7
By ARB groups, I mean a collection of Agrarian Reform Beneficiaries who have some organizational identity or common experience. Six out of the seven I interviewed are actually legally
recognized organizations.
8
Some groups had difficulty getting their members to participate in focus group discussions. When
it was not possible to conduct a focus group, I held key informant interviews with the designated
chairs of each group.
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remaining three groups are leased to MEPI. These groups are Davao Marsman Agrarian Reform Beneficiaries Multi Purpose Cooperative (DAMARB-MPC), the Santo
Tomas Individual Farmers Agrarian Reform Beneficiaries Cooperative (SIFARBCO),
and the Santo Tomas Agrarian Reform Beneficiaries Cooperative (STARBENCO).
In Tagum City, I interviewed ARBs from the Hijo Employees Agrarian Reform
Beneficiaries Cooperative (HEARBCO 2). The ARBs were employees of a banana
plantation which was owned by the Hijo group of companies. Before their current
AVA, HEARBCO 2 had an exclusive growership arrangement with Lapanday Foods.
After Typhoon Pablo in 2012, the cooperative could not sustain the growership contract. In 2014, they finalized an agreement with the Tagum Resources Agri Industries
Incorporated (TRAIN), a subsidiary of the Hijo resources corporation owned by the
Ayala family.
In the Pantukan district of Compostela Valley, I interviewed ARBs who had been
hacienda workers under the Nuere family who owned more than 32 ha. of coconut
trees. These ARBs received between 0.6 and 2.5 hectares each from the farm. They
were not organized. In 2002, a local company called Pantukan Agribusiness Development Corporation (PADCOR) leased the lands from the ARBs. The venture failed,
and in 2009, the investor sold the lease to Musahammat farms, a Middle Eastern
company.
These AVAs are on the two ends of the spectrum of contracts: lease and growership arrangements. I chose to focus on these because of their prevalence among the
officially listed AVAs which cultivate cavendish bananas. Of these 61 AVAs, 29 out of
61 (45.9%) are under a lease contract, while 28 out of 61 (48%) are under growership
arrangement.9
9

The figures here are based on a list of AVAs which I obtained from the DAR.
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Table 2.2 gives a summary of the individual interviewees in my sample from each
group. The ARBs in the sample are a largely old, male population, with the average
age for each group being more than 56 years old except for HEARBCO 2 in Tagum
city. The average household size for each group is over four members. Most of those
interviewed in each group own their house with an average experience of more than
26 years in cultivating Cavendish bananas. The exception to this is the ARBs in the
Pantukan district of Compostela Valley, only one of whom owns their dwelling and
lot, while none have experience with cultivating Cavendish bananas.
From Table 2.2, one can see no immediate relationship between the level of education that most members of each group obtained, and the types of contracts that they
enter. Intuitively, one may think that having a higher level of education will allow
ARB members to deliberate in a more informed manner about the types of contracts
available, and the consequences these may have for their well-being. While there is
no doubt a possible bias in my small sample, a clear relationship between contractual
type and education is absent. Many of the eight interviewees from MARBCO have not
finished High School, and many of those from MIFARBCO have only graduated High
School. By contrast, most of the ARBs from, HEARBCO 2 have finished college. One
may attribute this result to the fact that the sample is not completely random within
groups. The respondents may have self-selected to interview. However, as I shall show,
group level characteristics played a significant role in the types of contracts that the
ARBs obtained.

2.5

Findings

Table 2.3 gives a historical summary of the AVAs. Three of the seven ARB groups
have had only one AVA partner. These are the Lessor groups in Santo Tomas, Davao
Del Norte: DAMARB-MPC, SIFARBCO, and STARBENCO. These ARBs have had
their lands leased to the Marsman-Drysdale Estate Plantations Incorporated (MEPI)
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Table 2.2: The Sample Description- Education in terms of Mode and noted as follows: ELMU-Eelementary
Undergaduate,ELG-Eelementary Graduate, HSU-High School Undergraduate, HSG-High School Graduate, CLU-College
Undergraduate,CGR-College Graduate.

since they have been ARBs. By contrast, the other ARB groups have had two AVA
partners. The grower cooperatives transitioned from selling to MEPI to selling to
Sumitomo Fruit (SUMIFRU). HEARBCO 2 transitioned from a growership contract
with Lapanday fruits to a lease agreement with TRAIN. Finally, the ARBs from
Pantukan, Compostela Valley, used to have a lease arrangement with PADCOR, and
now lease their holdings to Musahamat farms. It is worth noting that three out of the
five lessor ARB groups currently have a contractual dispute with their AVA partners.
These disputes are in various stages of the legal process, but all are efforts by the
ARBs to withdraw or renegotiate lease agreements. Finally, of the seven ARB groups,
four are currently leased to the pre-agrarian reform land owners.

2.5.1

Factors of Contracting

To obtain information about the historical and political factors that contributed
to the formation of the AVAs among the different groups, I conducted focus group
discussions with four out of five lessor groups, and key informant interviews with the
chairs and board members of each grower cooperative, and one other lessor group. A
summary of these historical and political conditions is given by Table 2.4.
The first column states whether or not the ARBs were organized into some union,
cooperative, or association at the time of bargaining. Presumably, groups that bargain have more power vis-a-vis an investor since groups can pool resources to hire
lawyers, appeal to authorities in city centers, and mobilize for interventions in municipal agrarian reform offices. However, this may also result in unfavorable outcomes if
influential persons in the groups side with the investor. The next three columns state
whether the groups had access to advocacy from non-government organizations, or
from the DAR itself, and whether the groups had avenues to deliberate with their
members during the time of contracting. Advocacy includes education on AVAs and
legal assistance. Being able to access pro-land reform civic organizations can help
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the ARBs ensure that the resulting contracts are in line with the stated objectives
of CARP: improving the lives of the ARBs, and ensuring they maintain control over
their holdings. Membership consultation is important to ensure that a handful of
influential persons did not drive the contracting process. The next column states
whether members of the group were allowed to make a decision on their current AVA
at all. The absence of this ability would imply that the current AVAs were arrived at
without Free, Prior, and Informed Consent of individual ARBs.
The final column is organizational debt. Though this could be designated as an
economic circumstance, it is listed here among political conditions because it may be
the case that the ARB groups faced tensions between the interests of the organization,
or, the interests of individual members. A cooperative of growers, for example, might
have members that have earned, saved, and prospered, while others may not. Often,
cooperatives take out loans to ensure that their members have access to inputs, and to
maintain the infrastructure for cultivating bananas. If the cooperative goes bankrupt,
members who have done well may not need the cooperative’s help, but those who did
not may want to enter lease arrangements for a steady income. I shall now discuss
the historical specifics of each group.
Santo Tomas: Santo Tomas calls itself a banana town. Among the large fruit
exporters that have plantations in Santo Tomas are Lapanday Foods, DOLE, and
MEPI- an American owned agribusiness firm. When CARP began its implementation
in 1988, the Marsman Estate’s more than 1,400 hectares in Santo Tomas, Davao Del
Norte were given a ten-year grace period. The plantation had been in place since
1969, when the Marsman group of companies decided to set their sights on banana
cultivation. In 1998, the plantation was set for redistribution. According to focus
groups and key-informant interviews, MEPI pushed for lease contracts using forms
of bribery, coercion, and deception. How the ARBs responded to Marsman’s tactics,
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and the resources available to them affected the types of contracts currently governing
their holdings.
Santo Tomas- The Growers: MARBCO and MIFARBCO were once one organization called the Marsman Estate Agrarian Reform Beneficiaries Association Incorporated (MEARBAI). They had split before each began to contract with SUMIFRU
over the management of the cooperative’s over 136 hectares of land. Key informant interviews point to three reasons why the split occurred. The first is that MIFARBCO’s
members wanted manage their plots individually, while the cooperative manages a
packing plant, sales, quality checks, legal assistance and obtaining inputs. They claim
that this model was better since the area that each ARB would monitor would be
limited to a hectare, and they can make individual improvements on their holdings.
The second is that, initially, MEARBAI chose a business model where its members
shared profits equally. MIFARBCO’s members claimed that this resulted in a classic
free-rider problem: some ARBs did not handle their tasks properly, while those who
worked hard felt that they did not get the appropriate remuneration for their labor.
Finally, some members of MIFARBCO cited corruption in MEARBAI’s leadership.
However, I have not been able to obtain any evidence to support this accusation.
Regardless, MIFARBCO’s split from MEARBAI, and MEARBAI’s metamorphosis into MARBCO did not seem to make a difference in the types of contracts they
agreed upon with SUMIFRU. They both receive the same income per box of class A
bananas, and they have almost identical provisions on their obligations and rights.
The only difference is that MARBCO is able to sell its class B bananas to independent
buyers, while MIFARBCO sells solely to SUMIFRU10 .
10

Class B bananas fall short of the measurements of class A bananas, but were whole, had no
bruises or scales (cork-like aberrations on the skin), and were generally deemed to be fit for consumption. These are often sold in local supermarkets. One of MARBCO’s buyers is 7-11.
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In 1998, MEARBAI members already had contacts with pro-agrarian reform
NGOs. These provided them legal assistance and education on different types of
AVAs. The education they received included seminars on management, marketing,
and best practices in cultivation. They also partook in a lakbay-aral or educational
field visits where they learned about the experiences of growers and other types of
agribusiness arrangements. Through updating and sending a variety of members to
other farms, MEARBAI was able to convince its members to insist on a growership.
Both groups approached SUMIFRU independently. At this time, they already had
three years of experience as growers and legal contacts from asserting their claims as
ARBs. They felt that MEPI was deliberately paying them low prices for their bananas,
but they had to find an alternative buyer who would offer better prices, and who was
willing to pay MEPI for the remaining amortization payments of 293,733 pesos per
hectare. SUMIFRU was such a buyer, and in 2007, they began a growership agreement
after deliberating with their members. The consensus was that if they could get better
prices, they should switch partners. Today, officials of both coops say that their debts
are almost paid off, and they are ready to become sellers to the highest bidder by
2017 when their contracts with SUMIFRU end.
Santo Tomas-The Lessors: The members of the three lessor groups from Santo
Tomas Davao Del Norte all belonged to an organization called the Davao Marsman Agrarian Reform Beneficiary Association Incorporated (DAMARBAI). When
the Marsman estate was redistributed in 1998, DAMARBAI was seen as an association controlled by MEPI management, as opposed to MEARBAI, which was organized
by outside NGOs. There were different accounts about DAMARBAI’s actions in 1998.
My focus group discussion with current members of DAMARB-MPC suggest that the
lease contract was a product of assessing the risks and costs of a growership, and their
estimation of the strength of the existing union of MEPI farm workers. The rationale
was that cultivating bananas was far too expensive. The costs of fertilizers, maintain-
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ing the infrastructure, paying for labor, and building and maintaining a packing house
were too high. They did not have any capital, and they would already have to pay for
the amortization of the land. On top of this, MEPI would have been their buyer. If
they crossed MEPI by taking full ownership of their awarded holdings, then, MEPI
would take measures to ensure that they were not successful. On the other hand,
under a leasing arrangement, they would not have to pay for amortization and inputs, and MEPI would have to honor the collective bargaining agreements they had
from the farm workers’ union named the Davao Marsman labor Union (DAMLU).
This cost-benefit calculation is encapsulated in their name for the contract: "Walang
personalan. Trabaho lang" (Nothing personal. It’s just work.)
In contrast to their fellow farmworkers in MEARBAI, I was told by focus groups
with SIFARBCO and key informant interviews with STARBENCO that the members of DAMARBAI had not gone to see other farms under different agribusiness
arrangements. Instead, much of the education they received towed the line that growership was risky, and that they would be saddled with high-levels of debt. Further, the
lawyers whom they consulted were MEPI contacts. Eventually, the ARBs got their
certificates in 2002, and a debt-free leasing arrangement where they were secure in
their livelihoods. Unfortunately, this would not last.
In 2004 some of DAMARBAI’s members decided to break ranks. MEPI had kept
their lease payments at the lowest level for two years, citing bad harvests.

11

Some

100 ARBs decided that they wanted to opt for a growership option. They occupied
their lots and picketed the municipal agrarian reform office. This was the birth of the
Santo Tomas Agrarian Reform Beneficiary Association Incorporated (STARBAI).
STARBAI’s members were temporarily retrenched and reinstated in 2008. In 2010,
another land occupation broke out and MEPI decided to retrench all 241 workers
11

Table 2.5 summarizes the emphBeneficiary Trust Fund or the lease payment to the lessors in
Santo Tomas. It follows a step function, that rises with the number of boxes sold.
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belonging to STARBAI. MEPI was able to do this since the lease arrangement gives
them the right to hire and fire workers. Thus, while the ARBs legally own the land, the
lease arrangement makes them employees of MEPI. Further, MEPI can hire and fire
at will, which de facto excluded the offspring of STARBAI’s members from working on
their parents’ holdings. The municipality of Santo Tomas deployed the police against
the members of STARBAI. At least one person was killed during the dispersal.
Table 2.5: The Beneficiary Trust Fund peso values are based on 40 pesos/$
Annual
Incentive/
Yield
Box
(Boxes)
($)
≤ 4200
.071
4201-4300
.076
4301-4400
.081
4401-4500
.086
4501-4600
.091
4601-4700
.096
4701-4800
.101
4801-4900
.106
4901-5000 (or greater)
.111

Incentive/
Box
(Pesos)
2.8
3.04
3.24
3.44
3.64
3.84
4.04
4.24
4.44

It was not clear from focus group discussions why STARBAI split into SIFARBCO
and STARBENCO. Accusations of capitulating to MEPI and closeness to DAMARBMPC go both ways

12

. What is clear however is that both groups would like to

withdraw their holdings from the leasing arrangement, and cultivate these as growers.
They have already taken their case to the authorities with the help of several land
reform advocates. As of this writing, SIFARBCO and STARBENCO are waiting on
the Presidential Agrarian Reform Council (PARC) to adjudicate their case. Reports
from their lawyers indicate that the PARC has adjudicated in their favor. The only
signature they need as of the time of this writing is that of the sitting president’s,
12

After the events of 2004, DAMARBAI had changed its name to Davao Marsman Agrarian
Reform Beneficiaries Development Cooperative (DAMARB-MPC), and eventually changed to their
current name.
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Benigno S. Aquino III. The current DAR secretary is scheduled to convene a meeting
of the PARC and it is possible that this meeting will result in a decision regarding
these cases against MEPI.
Tagum City-HEARBCO 2 : HEARBCO 2 contracted with TRAIN in 2014, after
a typhoon hit their plantations, destroying much of their crops. While typhoon Pablo
was certainly a necessary cause for HEARBCO 2’s switch from a grower to lessor, it
is certainly not sufficient. Prior to the typhoon hitting Mindanao, Lapanday Foods
and HEARBCO 2 already had a contentious partnership.
HEARBCO 2 did not contract directly with Lapanday. Lapanday became HEARBCO 2’s buyer when Hijo sold their growership agreement. According to a focus
group discussion with members of HEARBCO 2, Lapanday made several demands
that forced HEARBCO 2 to go into debt. One example of this was building infrastructure such as irrigation pipes on the farm which the members of HEARBCO 2
had not agreed upon, but Lapanday insisted was necessary. Lapanday then counted
this as part of the ARBs’ debt and deducted these from the payments to the ARBs.
Another example is imposing the use of certain fertilizers that only Lapanday sold as
a form of quality control. These actions by Lapanday brought HEARBCO 2, along
with other cooperatives that sprung from Hijo employees, to the attention of land
reform advocates. Thus, by the time they broke with Lapanday, HEARBCO 2 had
legal assistance and contacts with numerous NGOs.
When typhoon Pablo hit, HEARBCO 2 was already 52 million pesos ($ 1,130,434)
in debt. The typhoon destroyed many of the trees in HEARBCO 2’s farm. In a focus
group discussion, I asked for an estimate of how many trees were destroyed. They
laughed and responded “Naku, dili na namin gi-isip, kay nagtu-aw kami diha!"(“Come
on, we couldn’t count because we were crying!"). This destruction was sure to increase
their debts with Lapanday.
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Instead of allowing Lapanday to step in, HEARBCO 2’s board approached TRAIN.
HEARBCO 2 saw a lease arrangement with a familiar partner as a way of overcoming
their debts and difficulties. One of the officials even narrated the dialogue she had
with one of the Ayala family members managing TRAIN. She told them “Ser, lupa
niyo ito. Dati niyo kaming trabahante. Naghihirap na kami." (“Sir, this was your land,
and we were your workers. We are already having a hard time"). TRAIN decided to
pay Lapanday for HEARBCO 2’s debts conditional on a lease agreement that would
span 60 years. According to one of the board members, they were hesitant to take
the lease agreement for such a long time, and many of their members did not trust
the new partnership. However, once they presented the reality of the debt figures,
the members acquiesced. The lease agreement was drafted by HEARBCO 2’s legal
counsel, and went into effect in 2014.
While the lease agreement with TRAIN stands for the next 60 years, HEARBCO
2 maintains some level of control over the AVA. HEARBCO 2 is responsible for
hiring and firing workers on the field and the packing houses, which gives them the
ability to determine the users of land. They are also responsible for operations, having
themselves been growers in the past. Thus, HEARBCO 2’s deal with TRAIN is a Lease
arrangement where they maintain some sticks in the bundle, giving them some degree
of control. It should be noted, however, that these abilities are not spelled out in their
contract with TRAIN.
Pantukan-Individual ARBs: The Pantukan ARBs were the only ARB group in
my sample that was neither organized when they first entered an AVA, nor officially
listed by the DAR. They were once tenants and farmworkers for a coconut farm. After
the land was distributed, the ARBs became indivicual coconut growers. From their
experience, coconut was a highly lucrative crop. They expected that they would be
able to sell a kilo of copra, the dried meat or kernel used to make coconut oil, for
twenty pesos. However, they found that this was not the case. All the ARBs were
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selling to one buyer, who now exercised monopsony power over the ARBs. The ARBs
were now selling a kilo of copra for 10 pesos a kilo.
Philippine Coconut authority estimates that, per hectare, a farmer can get a yield
of 1230 kgs of copra per hectare. At this price, the gross revenue from their holdings
would have been 12,300 pesos per hectare or 30,750 in total for the 2.5 hectares
allocated to each ARB. Taking out the average cost of cultivation for 2.5 has. at 9,
703.5, estimated by the coconut authority, the net revenue from cultivating coconuts
would have been 21,046.5. The total payments to the Land Bank for amortization
and land taxes would have been about 8,946.19.13 This leaves the ARB with a total
annual income of 12,100.31, or a bi-weekly income of 456 pesos ($10)

14

. This low

level of income did not allow the ARBs to meet their basic consumption needs, and
many were in danger of being evicted from their holdings.
In 2002, the Pantukan Agricultural Development Corporation (PADCOR) approached the ARBs individually with an offer to develop their lands into a banana
plantation in exchange for a leasing arrangement. Each of the ARBs saw this as an
opportunity to pay off their amortization. Further, the promise of a steady lease payment, and the framing of the employment provisions, made the lease contract seem
like a lucrative proposition. In a focus group discussion, they said that “Pwede kami
mag -rekomenda og isang anak, o kami mismo mag trabaho"(“We can recommend 1
child or we ourselves can work"). PADCOR eventually sold the lease to Musahamat
in 2009. Musahamat approached the ARBs with a very similar contract to PADCOR.
They signed the contracts because of a five-year advance on the lease payments. However, the promise of work did not materialize. Numerous reasons were given to me
during the focus group discussions, but one was remembered by all of the participants.
Some of the ARBs’ children work in nearby plantations that have unions organized
13

Figure taken from ARB receipts

14

This is about 5 pesos less than the daily minimum wage of a worker in Metro Manila
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by the Kilusang Mayo Uno (KMU). They were told that Musahamat did not want
KMU to influence other workers since it may disrupt production15 .
Today, the ARBs have formed an association, and would like to gain legal status so
that they can withdraw their holdings from the lease. They have formed connections
with both (KMU) and the Kilusang Magbubukid ng Pilipinas (KMP) in the hope of
gaining support in advocacy16 .

2.5.2

Comparing Histories

All these ARB groups, apart from those in Pantukan, were organized into some
sort of ARB association prior to the formation of their AVA. The ARBs of Pantukan
only made connections to pro-land reform organizations after their lease contract was
already in place. However, being organized or having connections with pro reform
forces by itself does not guarantee an AVA that allows ARBs to control their holdings.
In the case of the Santo Tomas Lessors, their organization at the inception of the
lease agreement with MEPI did not seem to conduct education regarding AVAs in
any serious manner. They merely reinforced the merits of a lease contract. NGO
and legal connections helped MIFARBCO, MARBCO and HEARBCO 2. While the
lessor groups of MEPI had legal consultation, they did not have communication with
pro-land reform forces. Finally, the Pantukan ARBs did not have legal consultation.
Group and individual debts, especially the amortization payment for the land,
were a factor in favoring lease contracts as opposed to growership contracts. The
ARBs’ perception of the level of debt that they would incur under alternative arrangements made the lease agreement look lucrative. In the case of the Santo Tomas
lessors, their possible debt payments were magnified by the DAMARBAI leadership.
The prospects of incurring greater debt made HEARBCO 2’s ARBs enter a leasing
15

Kilusang Mayo Uno- May 1st Muvement

16

Kilusang Magbubukid ng Pilipinas- Peasant Movement of the Philippines
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arrangement so that they could continue to make amortization payments and keep
their lands. The Pantukan ARBs individually had debts, but this mattered less than
the financial gains to be made under a lease arrangement with employment.
The extent of membership consultation is quite ambiguous. DAMARBAI’s consultation, according to focus groups, were more of an exercise in convincing members
of the merits of a lease contract. The Pantukan ARBs did not have an organization,
but discussed lease prices among their neighbors. However, they had not bargained
collectively. Finally, HEARBCO 2, MIFARBCO, and MARBCO had clear channels of
communication with their board members. At least in the formation of their contracts,
they were able to provide education, present their case to their respective groups, and
deliberate. Finally, MIFARBCO, MARBCO, and HEARBCO 2 had the opportunity
to bargain with prospective partners regarding the AVA contracts. The lessor ARBs
from Santo Tomas have different accounts of the bargaining process. The members
of the current DAMARB-MPC say they remember their board members bargaining
with MEPI. The members of SIFARBCO and STARBENCO say they did not. The
likely answer is that some negotiation happened, but the negotiators did not represent
the interests of the ARBs effectively because of the trivial education and membership
consultation.
Table 2.6 summarizes the contracts of the different ARB groups along with some
costs, benefits, and obligations. The lessor ARBs in Santo Tomas receive what is
called a Beneficiary Trust Fund (BTF) instead of a lease. This is computed as a
step function giving an amount of pesos depending on how many boxes are produced
by the AVA17 . The lease payments to HEARBCO 2 and Pantukan ARBs is a fixed
yearly amount with deductions for their amortization payments. The Pantukan ARBs
receive a lease of about 22,000 pesos a year. This amount increases by 5% every five
17

This computation is summarized in Table 2.5
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years. HEARBCO 2’s lease amonts to arount 17,000 pesos a year after they have paid
for debts and amortization payments. Under the lease contracts, the ARBs do not
share in the costs of production. By contrast, the grower ARBs share in the costs of
production, risk of their bananas being rejected, and possible natural calamities, as
with HEARBCO 2’s experience. Investors in growership also often have the ability to
take over the farms should there be crop failure.

2.5.3

Control

Table 2.7 presents the sticks in the bundle of property rights available to each
ARB group. The columns in the table are the same as the “sticks-in-the-bundle"
from Table 2.1. None of the contracts stipulate any room for ARBs to change the
use of their holdings away from banana production. Under growership contracts, the
ARBs can negotiate their per box prices, and determine who can use and work on the
land. Being able to negotiate the per box price has actually served both groups well
in the past. In the beginning of contracting with SUMIFRU, the per box price for
Class A bananas (at least 7.5 inches in length) used to be $2.90. The coops eventually
bargained up the price of class A boxes to $4.10 by presenting information from farms
growing for DOLE. In addition, the coop, MIFARBCO was able to gain the right to
look for other buyers of Class B bananas.
In contrast to the growership contracts, the lease contracts do not give ARBs the
formal right to bargain for better lease payments, or determine who gets to work on
their holdings. However, avenues exist for these groups to negotiate better leases, or
greater remuneration. In the case of the DAMARB-MPC members, they have been
able to negotiate wage increases and other benefits. Their contracts formally stipulate that MEPI will respect any collective bargaining agreements made through the
farm workers’ union of which, as employees of the plantation, the DAMARB-MPC
ARBs are members. However, this ability is conditional. Until 2010, the members of
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Lease (Ind.)

Lease
(Group)

Growers

Pantukan

Tagum

Location
Santo Tomas

Lease

STARB

Indiv ARBs

Lease

Lease

Lease

SIFARB

HEARB

Lease

Grower

Grower

DAMARB

MIFARB

Group
MARB

25

60

30

30

30

10

10

Lease

Lease+Emp

BTF

BTF

BTF+Emp

Per box

Per box

Contract Length
Type (Years) Remuneration

Investor
Responsibilities

None

None

None

None

None

None

None

None

None

None

All Production

All Production

All Production

All Production

All Production

Infra, Inputs, Rejected Bxs, Quality Control
Labor,
Full take over Packing Materials
Improvements
clauses

Infra, Inputs, Rejected Bxs, Quality Control
Labor,
Full take over Packing Materials
Improvements
clauses

Cost
Share

ARB
Production
Risks

Table 2.6: Contracts offered to groups of ARBs

N

N

N

N

N

N

Y

Investor

Investor

Investor

Investor

Investor

Investor

Investor

N

N

N

N

N

N

N

ARB sells
Class B,
PreOther Plants
Rejects Termination Allowed

Table 2.7: The-Sticks-In-the-Bundle under each group’s contract. Y=The group
has this ability, N=The group does not have this ability, C= The group has this
ability conditionally.

GROUP
Growership

Det. Land Use Det. Rem. Withdraw Det. Methods Det. User

MARB

N

Y

C

C

Y

MIFARB

N

Y

C

C

Y

Lease

DAMARB

N

C

N

N

N

(Group)

SIFARB

N

C

N

N

N

STARB

N

C

N

N

N

HEARB

N

C

N

N

Y

PAN

N

N

N

N

N

Lease (Ind.)
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SIFARBCO and STARBENCO were also members of DAMARB-MPC. They wanted
to withdraw their holdings from the lease contract. To do this, they occupied their
lands and refused to let the company harvest the standing crop. Since MEPI determines who can work on the ARBs’ holdings, all the participants of the mass action
were terminated. These were 241 ARBs in total, or 31% of DAMARB-MPC’s original
membership.
The ARBs from the Pantukan district also do not have the right to determine who
works on the plantation that leases their holdings. Of my sample, all of the ARBs
reported having at least one child who worked as casual laborers on other banana
plantations in the district. While these ARBs have no experience in banana farming,
they were hoping that their children would be able to get jobs in the plantation leasing
their lands. I received numerous accounts of why Musahammat farms did not want to
hire from the ARB families. One reason is under-qualification, despite the fact that
many of the families had members who were working in other banana plantations.
The other reason is that the country’s largest trade federation has organized in the
surrounding areas. Thus, hiring those that have worked in other banana plantations
would be allowing the trade union in the farm. Regardless of the reasons, the inability
of the ARBs to determine who uses land has deprived them of the ability to use their
holdings and appropriate the gains of cultivation.
The ARBs under growership arrangements have maintained a modicum of possession over their holdings. They can determine who can work on their holdings,
and thus, are entitled to the gains from cultivation. They are also given a chance to
withdraw from contracts and renegotiate the price of their output. However, these
abilities are limited. Withdrawing is conditional upon whether they can pay SUMIFRU for its initial investments for the land amortization owed to MEPI totalling
293,733 pesos per hectare. These costs were initially paid by SUMIFRU to MEPI
when the ARBs of MARBCO and MIFARBCO withdrew their growership contract
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from MEPI. Regardless, the ARBs under growership contracts can look for another
buyer and withdraw, as long as they have the funds to do so. When I interviewed the
current Coop chairs of both MARBCO and MIFARBCO, they said that the ARBs
would like to leave the contract with SUMIFRU since other banana buyers are now
locating in Santo Tomas. However, they are willing to continue the remaining two
years of their current contract since it is only a short time before the contract expires
and their debts are paid.
In contrast, ARBs in lease contracts have not preserved possession over their
holdings. They have no control over who gets to work on their land, the use of the
land, and the methods of farming. While they may be able to change the level of
remuneration they receive, this can only be done insofar as they remain workers in
the plantations on their land. The experience of SIFARBCO, STARBENCO and the
ARBs of Pantukan show that these ARBs remain vulnerable to the threat of exclusion
from the use of their holdings.

2.5.4

Income

What effect does the allocation of control have on the income of the ARBs? Table
2.8 gives information on ARB incomes. Total Income aggregates all income sources
for each individual ARB except for remittance income. This includes income from the
AVAâĂŹs, other plots of land, pension payments, income from having a store, from
driving motorcycles, carpentry, and other activities. I excluded remittance income
since the individual ARBs were reluctant to give figures for remittances. Some gave
the reason that they don’t want to make a mistake in their computations. Others
simply found the question intrusive. Instead, I noted whether or not they received
some form of remittance from relatives overseas. AVA income is the income that they
get from the AVA alone, such as profits from selling bananas grown on holdings they
received from CARP, lease payments, and wages from their AVAs.
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Table 2.8: Income Information: The numbers given are bi-weekly figures in Philippine Pesos. AVA Income as a % of Total Income is reported for the median interviewee.
"Remittance" and "Other" sources not reported in pesos, but as a percentage of the
sample who reported that these are part of their income.

Location
Santo Tomas

Group
MARBCO

Total
Income
AVA
AVA
Non-Ag
Remittance Other Income
(Median Income (% of Total) (% of Total) (% of Sample)
Earner
Reported) (Median)
(% of Sample)
9300
8050
71.00%
5.00%
0%
37.5%

Growership
MIFARBCO

Lease
(Group)

Lease (Ind.)

11800

10250

100.00%

0%

0%

16%

DAMARB-MPC 4934.16

645.83

17.00%

39.00%

0

14.29%

SIFARBCO

3304.6

554.6

14.58%

82.60%

0

60%

STARBENCO

2807.38

554.6

24.14%

62.00%

16.7%

100%

Tagum

HEARBCO 2

4608.69

4608.69

100.00%

0%

10%

25%

Pantukan

Indiv ARBs

3249.90

1399.9

25.86%

68.76%

11%

44%
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One of the justifications for AVAs is so that ARBs can use their holdings to
generate a viable agricultural livelihood (Department of Agrarian Reform, 1996). To
indicate how important the AVA income is to an individual in each group, I show here
AVA income as a percentage of overall income. I also note non-agricultural income
as a percentage of total income to show the extent to which ARBs within different
contractual arrangements are able to depend on agriculture for livelihood. Finally, I
note how many interviewees depend on other family members for some support such
as buying them food and other daily expenses.
The median bi-weekly income of MARBCO members is 9,300 pesos ($202) while
it is 11,800 pesos ($256) for MIFARBCO members 18 . On the other hand, the best-off
lessor ARBs, in terms of total income, are those of HEARBCO 2 and DAMARB-MPC.
The median income of the DAMARB-MPC ARBs is 4934 pesos ($107) while it is 4609
pesos ($ 100) for HEARBCO 2. However, the median interviewee from DAMARBMPC draws only 17% of total income from the AVA. Much of the income is drawn
from other activities. This is because many of the interviewees from DAMARB-MPC
are retirees who own small stores or have pensions. In contrast, the ARBs of the groups
who are not able to gain employment from the AVAs on their holdings are worse off.
The median interviewee from SIFARBCO earns a bi-weekly income of 3304 pesos
($71), while that of STARBENCO earns 2807 pesos ($61). The median interviewee
from the group of Pantukan ARBs earns 3250 pesos ($70). The gap between the total
income of the median HEARBCO 2 interviewee and that of SIFARBCO then is 1305
pesos ($28). It is also notable that SIFARBCO, STARBENCO and the Pantukan
ARBs get most of their income from non agricultural sources. Further, a greater
proportion of the interviewees from these groups depend on other family members
for income. Many of the able-bodied ARBs from these three groups have taken jobs
18

The peso-dollar exchange rate at the time of the survey was about 46 pesos to one dollar.
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in the farms of other growers or have found non agricultural employment such as
carpentry, smithing, and driving tricycles

2.5.5

19

.

Other Measures of Well-Being

Income is only one dimension of welfare. Table 2.9 presents data collected on
indicators of family welfare, conditions of the household, savings, and ownership of
key assets. Of the key assets, I chose the ownership of a motorcycle and a mobile. The
motorcycle is a common vehicle in these areas where the roads are often unpaved.
It allows people to travel across narrow roads and bridges. Owning a mobile phone
has become essential in communication whether for deliveries, town meetings, and
making appointments at government offices.
Table 2.9: Selected Assets, Childhood Education, and Facilities in dwelling
possessed or achieved by ARBs

Child Stop Running
School due Water Toilet
to Finance in House Access Electricity Motorcycle Mobile Savings
Location
Santo Tomas

Group
MARB

0%

87.5%

100%

100%

75%

100%

50%

MIFARB

17%

100%

100%

100%

100%

100%

66.7%

DAMARB

14.29%

100%

100%

100%

43%

100% 14.29%

SIFARB

73.33%

100%

100%

100%

27%

100%

0%

STARB

67%

100%

100%

100%

67%

100%

0%

Tagum

HEARB

55%

90%

100%

100%

100%

100%

25%

Pantukan

Indiv ARBs

55%

0%

100%

100%

56%

100%

0%

Growership

Lease
(Group)

Lease (Ind.)
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Tricycles are passenger vehicles which consist of a motorcycle harnessed with a very colorful
sidecar.
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Ownership or access to a mobile phone, in-house electricity, and toilets are available to all the ARBs. Those who have growership contracts, however, have less of an
incidence of children who discontinued schooling due to financial reasons. The incidence of children discontinuing schooling due to financial reasons is particularly high
for the lessor ARBs who cannot work on their lands, and the ARBs of HEARBCO
2 who suffered losses due to typhoon Pablo. It should be noted, however, that in
HEARBCO 2’s case, this was not due to their contract with TRAIN but because of
their growership with Lapanday.
Running water in-house is not available to the ARBs in Pantukan, but this is
mostly because of the infrastructure development in the municipality. All of them,
however, have access to water wells on their lots. The incidence of motorcycle ownership is also higher among members of grower coops, except for HEARBCO 2âĂŹs
members where all who were surveyed had motorcycles. Finally, growers also have a
higher incidence of respondents who reported savings.

2.6

Discussion and Policy Implications

The histories of the different ARB groups resulted in different contracts. The
contracts in turn affect their well-being today in terms of their income, and their
ability to obtain valuable assets and education for their children. In this section,
I discuss criteria under which we can assess the effects of these contracts on the
ARBsâĂŹ livelihood. I then outline some possible policy implications.

2.6.1

Normative Analysis

There are two ways we can conduct a normative analysis on AVAs. The first is to
take into account possible counterfactual scenarios for each ARB grouping. For the
Santo Tomas ARBs, we can directly compare the lease and growership contracts, since
these were the alternatives that were available to the ARBs at the time of contracting.
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The HEARBCO 2 ARBs were facing a choice between continuing as growers, perhaps
with another company, or, with taking the lease option from TRAIN. Finally, the
Pantukan ARBs faced the choice of entering an AVA or not.
With respect to the Santo Tomas ARBs, the lease AVAs have certainly been detrimental to the ARBs of DAMARB-MPC, SIFARBCO and STARBENCO. If the ARBs
had chosen to only accept growership contracts, their fortunes would be different today. Some may still have contracted with MEPI, but competition from SUMIFRU
and other buyers would have made it difficult for MEPI to exploit monopsony power
over the ARBs. Certainly, the absence of NGO advising, legal counsel, and strong
ARB organizing had a role to play in the divergent outcomes between the leasing and
grower ARBs. Further, DAMARBAI’s push to convince the ARBs that they had a
better chance as lessors created uncertainty about the growership contracts. As one
SIFARBCO member puts it: “Walang hiya yang DAMARABAI, nanloko lang. Naku,
kung alam lang namin sana."(“Damn that DAMARBAI, all they did was lie. If we
only knew.")
Some lease contracts, however, are better than others. Assuming that the Pantukan ARBs’ prices remain as they were when they harvested the last of their coconut
crop, then the ARBs improved their income positions by taking the AVA. The lease
contract of the HEARBCO 2 members allowed them to avoid further debt, and they
have been able to make a living with the lease payments and wages. One counterfactual scenario for the ARBs of HEARBCO 2 would have been a similar growership
contract to that of MIFARBCO and MARBCO under SUMIFRU. In my focus group
discussions with coop members, SUMIFRU had offered the same deal, with the same
conditions, but, perhaps for a longer period since the debts of HEARBCO 2 were
larger. Had they gotten this deal under SUMIFRU, they may have had to take out
more debts to cover the damage done to their farms, provide fertilizer and other inputs, and would have had to pay SUMIFRU for their aerial spraying. It is difficult
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to say whether a SUMIFRU-HEARBCO 2 partnership would have resulted in better
outcomes, or outcomes equivalent to that of MARBCO and MIFARBCO.
The other way to conduct a normative analysis is to ask whether these AVAs
meet certain ends. These can be taken from the official justifications of the state for
encouraging such arrangements. The first is to make smallholder farming economically
viable for the farmer. The second is to ensure beneficiary possession and control of the
land. Last is to introduce facilities and technological improvements that could increase
ARB incomes

20

. Under these criteria, the contracts of MARBCO and MIFARBCO

have certainly succeeded. The one issue that they have is that there is no visible way
to observe outside options so they can bargain for better prices.
Under these criteria, AVAs have failed the Pantukan ARBs, the members of SIFARBCO and the members of STARBENCO. While the median income of the sample
exceeds poverty incomes, the ARBs in my sample obtained income largely from activities outside their holdings21 . Thus, the improvements that were introduced on the
ARBs’ holdings do little to facilitate their livelihoods. Moreover, these ARBs cannot
utilize their land, let alone gain any control of it. One of the questions that I had asked
all interviewees was whether there was any value to owning land. One of the Pantukan
ARBs answered this question as follows: “Wala, mamatay na kami" (“None, we’ll be
dead before then."). Though this answer does not reflect the consensus among the
ARBs I interviewed, it follows from the present situation that some of them face. The
lands awarded to them yield neither improvements in income, or a viable livelihood.
Morover, their struggle to assert land ownership has been drawn out to the point
20

These objectives are stated in the Administrative Order 09-06 under the Department of Agrarian
Reform. In the time I was in the Philippines, this administrative order was translated into a law to
regulate AVAs called House Bill 5161. It has not yet passed.
21

By poverty income, I am using the World Bank standard of $1.90/day, which, in bi-weekly terms
would come to 1,223.6 pesos(World Bank and IMF, 2015).
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that, due to their age, some ARBs do not foresee themselves as reaping the rewards
of land ownership in their lifetimes.
While the Lease AVAs have been kinder to ARBs in HEARBCO 2 and DAMARBMPC, it has only been kind insofar as these ARBs have continued their employment
in the AVA. The stipulations of the contracts, however, do not give ARBs the right to
be employed on their landholdings. These decisions are made by MEPI and TRAIN.
However, stipulations that help ARBs gain some control over employment exist in each
of these situations. DAMARB-MPC, and HEARBCO, under the current management
structure are responsible for personnel issues including hiring and termination. Again,
however, it is questionable whether these rights are secure, since they are not written
into their contracts.

2.6.2

Policy implications

Steps have to be taken to avoid contractual arrangements that deprive ARBs
of control over their lands. The DAR explicitly discourages the formation of lease
arrangements, calling these a “last resort"(Presidential Agrarian Reform Committee,
1997). Such policies, without addressing the underlying economic considerations that
motivate lease arrangements, are insufficient. As in the case of HEARBCO 2, even
growership arrangements can be written to pass costs to ARBs, preventing their
success and driving them to financial hardship. Policy makers should not see AVAs as
a means to address the challenges which ARBs face. They should instead tackle these
problems first so that agribusiness partnerships become a viable option for ARBs.
In the context of a post-CARP rural economy, familiar measures such as guaranteeing affordable credit, insurance, and building farm-to-market roads would reduce
the anticipated costs of cultivating bananas. Such policies reduce the incentives for
smallholders to accept contracts where they lose effective control over land. CARP,
however, also introduces the burden of amortization payments to ARBs. My findings
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suggest that amortization payments are one of the reasons that ARBs take contracts
where the cede control over their holdings. The state has to formulate an alternative method of compensation to former landowners that does not pass this burden to
ARBs. Further, the pricing of land must not include the former owner’s subjective
valuation since this leaves room for manipulation by landed elites. Of late, some land
reform advocates have already called for making land distribution free22 . This would
certainly be a welcome development, but it needs to address the difficulties of current
ARBs who bear the debt burden.
Agrarian reform authorities must also give institutional support to ARBs. One
way to do this is to provide pro bono legal assistance and consultation. This service
is particularly important for ARBs who find themselves in unfair contracts, and who
would like to renegotiate their terms of incorporation. Second, they can regularly
convene key representatives of agrarian reform groups who they can consult on cooperative formation, contracting, and best practices that they may suggest to ARBs. By
doing so, ARBs can obtain more information on alternative contracts, profit levels,
costs, and possible methods of financing farm operations. This would help ARBs who
are deciding on alternative contractual arrangements and would like to see what their
peers have been able to achieve.
Another possible intervention is a method of streamlining contract renegotiations.
Currently, what I have gathered from focus groups and key informants is that the
procedure for renegotiating contracts has several layers. First, the municipal agrarian
reform office (MARO) must recommend a case to the PARC. Once the PARC approves
the merit of a case, it sends a fact-finding mission. This fact-finding mission then
makes recommendations to the PARC which, then, all members of the committee
22

The new proposal by a coalition of progressive parties called the Makabayan (Pro-people) bloc is
called the Genuine Agrarian Reform Bill. This has not yet passed, but proposes free land distribution
as one of its main objectives.
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must sign. For SIFARBCO and STARBENCO, it is a process that has taken several
years. With such a lengthy process, ARBs would incur costs in both legal fees, and
the opportunity cost of foregone income from possible contractual improvements.
Streamlining the process may ensure that ARBs can exercise the credible threat of
evicting their agribusiness partners so that they have control over their holdings. The
criteria for adjudicating contracts is already given by CARP- land ownership has to
create viable livelihoods for ARBs, and they should maintain control and autonomy
over their holdings.
Finally, the DAR and its local government counterparts should partner with pro
agrarian reform forces who are actively involved in organizing rural communities. Such
forces could assist in organizing ARB cooperatives, monitor existing partnerships, and
assist in delivering grievances regarding contracts. Authorities in the Philippines, however, have a history of exhibiting hostility against such forces23 . Thus, before the DAR
can engage pro-reform forces, there needs to be a commitment within the Philippine
state to ensure the welfare of ARBs and the democratic rights of civil society organizations. To this direction, there is some optimism since the newly appointed secretary
of agrarian reform, Rafael Mariano, is a long-time peasant advocate and former chairman of the Peasant Movement of the Philippines (KMP)24 . To what extent he can
deliver pro-ARB measures despite a landlord dominated legislature remains to be
seen.
These proposals are in line with interventions that enable ARBs to organize and
bargain for better contracts, reduce costs of marketing crops for smallholders, and
measures that ease access to technologies (Reardon et al., 2009). In theory, AVAs
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One such case is the killing of a peasant leader in Compostela
http://bulatlat.com/main/2015/04/30/peasant-leader-killed-in-compostela-valley/
24

Valley:

KMP stands for the Filipino name: Kilusang Magbubukid ng Pilipinas. The press has lauded
Mariano’s appointment in articles such as the following: http://www.rappler.com/newsbreak/indepth/140006-agrarian-reform-rafael-mariano-profile
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and other modes of agribusiness incorporation has the potential to benefit ARBs and
other smallholders. The fact that many of them are not implies that more needs to
be done to make this potential a reality.

49

CHAPTER 3
CONTRACTING CONTROL

3.1

Introduction

Lately, there has been considerable interest among scholars and policy makers in
partnerships between smallholders and agribusiness. On the one hand, some see these
partnerships as a means of improving livelihoods by introducing new technologies,
access to seeds and credit, and international trade networks (Cotula, 2012; Mondiale,
2008). On the other hand, others have cautioned of the potential of such arrangements
to effectively dispossess smallholder communities, causing them to lose access to their
landholdings and livelihoods (Menguita-Feranil, 2013; German et al., 2016).
To mitigate the possible adverse effects of smallholder incorporation, two institutional recommendations surface from recent literature (Deininger, 2011; Cotula and
Leonard, 2010; Deininger, 2013). The first of these is land titling to secure smallholder
communities from expropriation by both state actors, and non-state entities. The second recommendation is that of ensuring that smallholders have an understanding of
contracts, and are able to enter these with free, prior, and informed consent. Land
titling has received much attention in the development literature. The idea behind
this policy recommendation is that insecure property rights may generate inefficiencies, since uncertainty would reduce investment or, divert resources toward protecting
property(Ghatak and Besley, 2010; Auerbach and Azariadis, 2015). However, scholars
(see e.g. Lavers, 2012; White et al., 2012) and civil society groups (see e.g. Colchester et al., 2011) have reported that even with formally recognized rights to land,
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contracting with agribusiness firms result in smallholders losing effective control or
possession over their holdings.
In a field study in the Philippines (see Chapter 2), I encountered agribusiness arrangements that deprived land owners of rights to land. In 2015, I studied agribusiness
contracts among agrarian reform beneficiaries (ARBs) in the Philippines. These farms
were devoted to the cultivation of Cavendish bananas- the type of bananas that are
most commonly sold in stores here in the United States, Japan, China and Europe.
Most of the smallholder groups that I studied, had leased their lands to agribusiness
firms. These leases run between thirty and sixty years, and the agribusiness firms
determine who can cultivate the land as wage workers. Among my forty-one interviewees in the Municipality of Santo Tomas, Davao Del Norte, twenty-one currently
have no access to their land (1.02 hectares each) since they have been terminated
from their plantation jobs after contesting their wages and benefits. Today, they earn
bi-weekly incomes of about $61. While this figure is around twice the official poverty
income of $1.90/ day, it falls well short of the bi-weekly income of $100 or more that
other lessor ARBs in the region earn that have not been excluded from using their
holdings as farm laborers.
There is evidence that lease contracts are prevalent among agrarian reform beneficiaries in the Philippines. Among lands that have been awarded by the agrarian
reform program, the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) has documented about
47,990 ha. in total that are under some form of contract with agribusiness firms. Of
these, 28,573 ha. or roughly 59.5% are under lease arrangements.1 The remainder are
under growership contracts where investors merely purchase crops from landowners
1

This is likely an underestimate. In fact, one of the sites in my field work was not documented by
the DAR. Further, the DAR’s documented number of agribusiness deals cover only a small portion
of agribusiness arrangements with ARBs which the Philippines’ National Economic Development
Authority (NEDA) has estimated at 1.2 million hectares or about 28% of the country’s total arable
land (Reported by Philippine Inter-agency Committee).
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who decide on employment, inputs and methods of cultivation, and varying jointventure agreements where each party to the contract is given some control over landuse, and profits are shared. There some evidence that lease arrangements prevail
among agribusiness arrangements internationally (Anseeuw et al., 2012). Why is it
that, despite the formal recognition of property rights, landowners enter into longterm contracts where they effectively lose control over their holdings? Even when
the property-rights of landowners remain intact, agribusiness firms can write contracts that deprive landowners of certain abilities over their holdings, and sometimes,
completely deprive them of control. This, in turn, may adversely affect the level of
remuneration that smallholders obtain from the partnership.
In recent institutional and legal literature, property rights are conceptualized as
a bundle of sticks or a set of abilities that an owner can exercise over her asset (Cole,
2002; Glackin, 2014). A typical list would include: the rights to use the asset, to
appropriate the gains from use of the asset, to change the use of the asset, and to
alienate it via collateral and sale. The right to use land would involve planting crops,
working on the land, and inhabiting it. The right to appropriate gains from land may
include determining who can benefit from the what is cultivated and determining
the shares of profits from crops. The right to change land use may include changing
what is cultivated and who is cultivating. Finally, the right to alienate means being
able to use land as collateral for loans or to put it up for sale. By definition, having
property rights over land means being granted a subset or all of these four “sticks in a
bundle" by law (Hodgson, 2015). Being granted these rights, however, does not mean
that one has possession or control over the asset. For example, a landlord may give a
tenant use rights to land and even allow him to change the crops planted. Through
a sharecropping contract, the tenant may have some right to appropriate its gains.
However, if the landlord maintains the right to alienate his land, he may sell it to
a developer and dispossess the tenant. Under such an arrangement, the tenant has
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some sticks in the bundle, but the landlordâĂŹs ability to sell the land can overcome
whatever entitlements the tenant had.
The ability to control or possess land is a matter of having the appropriate bundle
of sticks that will allow a person to exclude others from determining its use. In a lease
contract, for example, withdrawal from the contract by the smallholder could be made
difficult with costly legal procedures and compensation for an investor’s investments.
It can also be the case that an investor introduces options to renew the contract, de
facto making withdrawal an impossibility2 . Purchasing or growership contracts may
introduce stringent control measures such as limiting buyers for smallholder crops,
and limiting the sources of fertilizer and credit. While these do not preclude smallholders from withdrawing their holdings, such measures may result in difficulties for
smallholders in excluding current partners from cultivation. Such contract provisions
assign certain sticks in the bundle to the investor, giving him the ability to determine
how land is used and who can obtain a greater share of profits from cultivation. This
assignment does not necessarily result in the investor having complete control over
land. However, the resulting assignment of rights may make it easier for the investor
to determine how land is used, and also convey some ability to prevent the smallholder
from withdrawing her holding from the partnership. This is a partial re-assignment
of control.
In this essay, I present a formal model to give an explanation of how investors
can wrest degrees of control from landowners. The subject of land relations and land
contracting has often been treated within the principal-agent framework where the
landowner, as principal, designs a contract that maximizes his profits, and gets the
agent (often, a peasant farmer) to work for him. However, partnerships between smallholders and investors differ considerably in this model. Instead, we have an investor
2

This is common among lease contracts in the Philippines as observed in my own field work as
well as by other scholars(e.g. Borras, 2007; Department of Agrarian Reform, 2006).
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and a smallholder who decide whether or not to enter into a partnership for cultivation. The smallholder has land, while the investor has some expertise in acquiring
technology, trade networks, and is able to introduce new sources of inputs for the
smallholder. Neither is a pure principal, nor a pure agent.
The exchange of assets and expertise in the context of a partnership has been often
been treated within the context of firm integration. One way to model firm integration
is to explicitly model compensation mechanisms under different contract types such
as leasing, joint venture, and purchasing contracts. The literature highlights certain
determinants in the choice of contract type such as institutions (Karabay, 2010; Cui,
2011), costs (Svejnar and Smith, 1984; Asiedu and Esfahani, 2001), risks (Das, 1999),
and even property rights restrictions (Che and Facchini, 2009). While these shed light
when certain contractual arrangements are used, the issue of control is not treated
explicitly. The partners have to agree to the contracts, but there is no conceptualization of how control rights are assigned within the contracts themselves apart from
the level of investment each player allocates.
Another way to model firm integration is to assign rights based on productivity
and bargaining power, determining which partner can exclude the other from the
use of the asset. This framework was pioneered by Grossman and Hart (1986), and
more recently adopted by Schmitz (2013a), Schmitz (2013b), and Antràs (2014).The
problem often treated in this literature is the choice of the ownership structure which
maximizes profits for two partners when they decide to merge. This ownership structure is decided before either party invests in the project. Once it is chosen, the partners
(say a smallholder, S and an investor, I) decide on their levels of investment, and the
total surplus is determined via a Nash bargaining process. The partners can choose
between ownership structures where one of them completely owns the firm, or the firm
is owned jointly. If I owns the firm, then his reservation payoff is the value of his in-
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vestment, scaled by a parameter that reflects relation-specificity or, the disadvantage
that he may have in production from withdrawing from the partnership.
My innovation to this framework is to relax the assumption that the choice of a
firm structure is a discrete choice of ownership. Rather, I introduce a parameter κ
that I decides to offer S in order to induce him to put up the land for the agribusiness
project and invest in it. This parameter is a scalar weight on S’s disagreement payoff.
It is meant as a measure of S degree of control over land. That is, one can think
of κ as an index for the degree to which S possesses the various of sticks-in-thebundle of property rights stipulated by a contract written by I. We can think of
variations of κ as variations in the type of contract. When κ = 1, then, this resembles
a grower or contract-farming arrangement where S can make all production and landuse decisions, and even look for new buyers. Lease contracts would be given by κ → 0
where S can make very few, if any, decisions on the use of land and cannot withdraw
from the partnership.
As in the literature on firm integration, there are three determinants of the level
of control which I take to be exogenous. The first two are costs and productivity
differences. The third determinant is bargaining power, which I use here in two ways.
The first is the bargaining institutions that govern the partnership. S and I know
their relative bargaining power once a contract is in place. The second way that I use
bargaining power is the ability of either party to make a unilateral offer of control.
Whoever has this ability will be able to choose the level of control that defines the
contract. In this model, property rights are presumed to be secure, ex-ante, and thus,
contracts are entered voluntarily3 .
The paper is arranged as follows: Section 3.2 introduces the model’s main functions, the sequence of the game, and the resulting levels of investment and profit which
3

The insight that institutions can be differentiated between bargaining and property rights institutions was first gleaned by Acemoglu and Johnson (2005).
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informs I’s choice of κ. I examine two cases for offers of κ. In Section 3.3, I derive
values of κ that I can feasibly offer under a limited set of parameter values which S
accepts. Further, I show how the institutional characteristics affect I’s offer of control
to S. In Section 3.4, I derive S’s offer of control to I and show the relationship
between this offer, and the quality of institutions. I conduct a limited comparison of
these outcomes using two frameworks in Section 3.5. The first of these compares
the outcomes in terms of the degree of control that S is able to maintain over their
holdings, and in terms of the total payoffs that S and I receives. Finally, I discuss the
results of the model, its policy implicatuions, and limitations in Section 3.6. The
proofs of the results are presented in Appendix A.

3.2

The Model

There are two players, I, who can invest in cultivation, and S who owns land,
without which neither player can produce. I needs to gain access to S’s land through
a partnership where each party invests in cultivation. The value of S’s investment
qS (x) = qS xS , where xS is the smallholder’s input of effort in production, and qS is
a productivity constant. At autarky, or when S chooses to cultivate on her own, the
cost of investment for S is given by cA (x) = cA

x2S 4
.
2

The value of I’s investment is

qI (x) = qI xI , and he can obtain xI at a cost cI (x) = cI
costs to investing are reduced to cS (x) = cS

x2S
,
2

x2I
.
2

If S contracts with I , the

where cA > cS . This resembles policy

pronouncements which claim that smallholders who partner with outside investors can
gain through cost reductions in farm inputs. Producing together, the total product is
q(x) = qI xI + qS xS . We can think of the combined product of S and I as follows: both
S and I can produce a crop by combining land, fertilizer, labor, and access to trade
networks. However, S, for example may have an advantage in obtaining labor, but
4

The cost function conveys that investments in xi , i ∈ {S, I} entail unobservables such as disutility
for either partner, along with prices.
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I may have an advantage in finding buyers. Each partner adds these advantages to
total output. In keeping with justifications for encouraging agribusiness partnerships,
I assume that qI ≥ qS , so that the investor’s inputs add more to total product that
the smallholder’s. Finally, I assume that qS , qI , cA , cS , cS > 1 to simplify the range of
cases5 .
In deciding whether or not to enter a partnership with I, the payoffs to a partnership would have to yield at least the level of profits to A that she would be able to
obtain had she cultivated her land on her own. Should she cultivate on her own, then,
S would have to decide on how much to invest on her land by solving the following
optimization problem:
maxxS ΠS (x) = qS xS − cA

x2S
2

Solving this problem yields the following result:
Lemma 1. The payoff to S at autarky is given by

ΠS (xA
S) =

qS2
2cA

The payoff given by Lemma 4 is S’s participation constraint. Below this level, S
will not accept a partnership with I.
If the investments of each party are perfectly observable, then, they simply collaborate to maximize the total surplus by solving the following problem:

max(xI ,xS ) ΠF B (x) = qI xI + qS xS − cI

5

x2I
x2
− cS S
2
2

We can think of the costs to smallholders in a broad sense to include costs incurred due to
weaknesses in property rights institutions. These include investing in protection against expropriation(e.g. Grossman and Kim, 1995), or lack of access to credit (Besley et al., 2012) which may reduce
the payoffs to the smallholder in autarky.
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Lemma 2. The first best levels of investment are given by:

xFI B =

qS
qI
, and xFS B =
cI
cS

The following corollary shows that the S’s first-best level of investment is greater
than what she could afford had she chosen to cultivate her land-holding:
Corollary 1. xFS B > xA
S
Corollary 8 follows from the fact that cA > cS . The partnership, in the firstbest case introduces cost-reductions for S, thus increasing her level of investment in
cultivation.
Since the investments of both parties involve investments of effort, they are not
perfectly observable, and the partners have to bargain over the division of the total
surplus. However, bargaining in this setting is governed by institutional factors that
either party cannot influence once they have been set6 . These institutional factors
are defined by τ ∈ [0, 1], where τ is the relative bargaining power of S, given by laws
and institutions. We can think of τ as the relative ease by which S can appeal to
authorities for a favorable division of gains in the partnership, and/or the existence
of organizations that can empower smallholders to demand greater levels of remuneration. In either case, I assume that τ is set and cannot change within the horizon of
contracting treated in the present paper.
The ability of either party is limited in influencing the shares of surplus that they
can obtain in a partnership. However, I can write a contract which can limit S’s level
of control over her landholding. Thus, I’s contract is given by κ ∈ [0, 1]. By control,
here I mean the ability to withdraw from the partnership should either party find
the division of gains and relative effort levels unsatisfactory. If κ = 0, this means
6

It may certainly be the case that either party has tried to influence this in the past. However,
that is a separate problem from the one currently treated in this paper
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that S cannot credibly withdraw her land from the contract, and thus, I effectively
determines the use of the land. If κ = 1, S can credibly withdraw her holding from
the contract. Intermediate values of κ can be interpreted as being able to withdraw
land holding from the partnership with some degree of difficulty on the part of S.
This interpretation of control lends itself to a natural specification within the
framework of bargaining. Since κ designates S’s ability to withdraw her landholding
from the partnership, κ, then, strengthens S’s bargaining position. A higher level of
κ means that S is more able to withdraw her landholding in case of a disagreement.
Thus, the disagreement or threat payoffs to S and I respectively are given as follows:
• DS = κqS (xS ) for S
• DI = (1 − κ)qI (xI ) for I
I’s offer of the degree of control, then, determines the bargaining position of S in the
context of their partnership. The timing of the game is given thus:
1. I offers S a contract with a certain level of κ.
2. S decides to accept or reject I’s offer.
3. If the offer is accepted, S and I choose their levels of investment.
4. I and S bargain over the division of the total surplus q(x) = qI xI + qS xS .
I will solve this game via backward induction. That is, I will first obtain the solution
to the Nash bargaining problem. This will determine the benefits for each partner,
which in turn determines their level of investment. Together, the results of the bargain
and the cost of investment will determine the payoffs or profit to S and I which result
from the partnership. Finally, I will choose his offer of κ to maximize his profits.
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3.2.1

Investment Levels and Profits

At the last stage, I and S will bargain over their shares of the total surplus given
the level of institutional quality τ . This problem is stated as follows:

maxRS π N = (q(x) − RS − DI )(1−τ ) (RS − DS )τ

Lemma 3. The resulting levels of remuneration to each player is given by:
• RS = (κ(1 − τ ) + τ )qS xS + τ κxI
• RI = (1 − τ κ)qI xI + (1 − (κ(1 − τ ) + τ ))xS
These levels of remuneration have two components. The first terms, ((κ(1 − τ ) +
τ )qS xS , for S, and (1 − τ κ)qI xI , for I) shows the payoff that each player gets from her
own investment. The second terms (τ κxI for S, and (1−(κ(1−τ )+τ ))xS , for I) reflect
the benefit that each gets from the other player’s investments. For what follows, let
QS = qS (κ(1 − τ ) + τ ), QI = qI (1 − κτ ), QS1 = qs (1 − (κ(1 − τ ) + τ )), QI1 = qI κτ . The
choice of investment for S and I, respectively, is given by the following optimization
problems:
x2S
ΠS = QS xS + QI1 xI − cS
2

(3.1)

x2I
2

(3.2)

and,
ΠI = QI xS + QS1 xI − cI

Note that the profits of S and I increase with the other partner’s investments, implying that each has an incentive to ensure that the other partner invests a higher level
of xi , i ∈ {S, I}.
Proposition 1. The equilibrium choice of investments will be given by:

xN
S =

QS
QI
, and xN
I =
cS
cI
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We can show further that,
Corollary 2.
FB
FB
xN
and xN
S < xS
I < xI

This is a standard result in agency problems. Since the investments of S and I
are not perfectly observable by the other partner, the rewards from the partnership
depend on the levels of control chosen, and the institutional quality confronting each
player. The profits to S and I from this partnership, given these levels of investement,
are given by:
ΠS (xN
S) =

QI
Q2S
+ QI1
2cS
cI

(3.3)

ΠI (xN
I ) =

QS
Q2I
+ QS1
2cI
cS

(3.4)

and

Anticipating these levels of profit from the partnership, whoever has the ability to
make unilateral offers of κ faces two incentives in ceding or wresting control. The first
terms in both equations (3.3), and (4.4) are the benefits that each player gets from
their own investment. The second terms in these equations are the benefit that each
gets from their partners’ investments.

3.3

The Investor’s Offer of Control

In general, there is a tension in I’s choice of κ. On the one hand, κ would reduce
I’s payoff since it increases S’s bargaining position, thus, raising the necessary level
of remuneration to get S to allow I to access her land. On the other hand, I also
benefits from S’s investment which would increase in κ. This tension is refelected in
the following result:
Corollary 3.
dQS
dQI
dQS1
dQI1
> 0,
< 0,
< 0, and
>0
dκ
dκ
dκ
dκ
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The preceding result suggests that κ reduces I’s investment in the project, and
his ability to capture some level of S’s investment. However, it also increases S’s
investment, thus demonstrating the tension inherent in his choice of κ. Thus, I must
balance the costs and benefits that accrue to him through his choice of control. This
problem is summarized in the following optimization.

maxκ ΠI (xN
I ) =

Q2I
QS
+ QS1
2cI
cS

A
s.tΠS (xN
S ) ≥ ΠS (xS )

(3.5)

Equation (4.5) is the participation constraint, reflecting that I’s choice of κ must
result in a contract that will at least yield the same level of profits as S would get
had she cultivated her land-holding using her own resources. The payoff at autarky
differs from S’s disagreement payoff (DS ) since the disagreement payoff applies only
when S decides to partner with I. Within the context of the partnership, S faces
lower costs to her investment as opposed to the costs she faces at autarky. The next
result suggests that an offer of κ∗ ∈ [0, 1], acceptable to S depends on the relative
costs to each partner’s investment, the value of their investment, the cost reductions
introduced by the partnership, and the institutional quality.
Proposition 2. Whenever τ ∈ ( 21 , 23 ), cA >

2cS
τ2

and cS ∈ (cI

2 (1−τ )2
qS
q 2 (1−τ )
, cI S q2 τ ),
2qI2 τ 2
I

then,

S accepts I’s offer of κ∗ ∈ (0, 1) where,

κI∗ =

cI qS2 (1 − τ ) − qI2 cs τ
2cI qS2 (1 − τ )2 − qI2 cs τ 2

(3.6)

Proposition 2 shows a possible set of parameter values wherein it is feasible for I
to offer a level of κ ∈ (0, 1), or, an intermediary level of control. The conditions of
this Proposition suggest that, (1) institutions have to favor S but yield some power to
I(τ ∈ ( 21 , 23 )), (2) that the cost reductions to S’s investments have to be large enough
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(cA >

2cS
),
τ2

and (3) the cost of S’s investment are less than a critical proportion

of the costs of I’s investment (cS < cI

2 (1−τ )
qS
).
qI2 τ

Other sets of parameter values may

result in intermediary values of κI∗ , but this case is of interest since it ensures that,
the resulting level of κI∗ maximizes I’s profits, and that S’s participation constraint
does not bind. further, this case is also of interest since it ensures that S’s profits are
concave in κ.7

3.3.1

Investor’s Case: Institutional Quality and Control

Intuitively, we expect that the quality of institutions would affect the levels of
control for S. The greater the bargaining power of S, the more she is able to demand
a better level of remuneration within the context of a partnership with I. However, I’s
offer of κ needs to ensure that he is entering a profitable partnership. If institutions
favor S, I may use κ to increase his bargaining position, thus ensuring a favorable
return. Further, recall that the partnership lowers the costs of S’s investments. Thus,
S might be willing to concede ownership of her land if the cost reductions make
entering the partnership a more palatable alternative.
One can see the ambiguous effect of τ on I’s decision in the profit function of I.
Just as the profit equations suggest a tension in I’s choice of κ, there is also a tension
in how the institutional quality affects I’s profits. On the one hand, a higher level
of τ reduces I’s share of the total surplus. However, it also raises S’s incentive to
invest, thus, increasing I’s payoffs8 . Equation (3.6) shows reflects this since there is a
non-linear relationship between I’s offer of κ∗ , and S’s level of bargaining power τ . In
this section, I explore the relationship between institutional quality and the chosen
levels of control.
7

See Appendix of Proofs

8 dQS
dτ

dQS1
I
= qS (1 − κ) > 0, dQ
dτ = −κτ < 0, dτ = −qS (1 − κ) < 0
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The level of κI∗ given by Proposition 2 yields a degree of control that is acceptable
to S, and is the result of a I’s profit maximization. The following result suggests that,
indeed, an increasing level of τ , within these parameter values reduces I’s offer of κI∗ .
Corollary 4. Whenever τ ∈ ( 12 , 32 ), and cS < cI

2 (1−τ )2
qS
,
2qI2 τ 2

then

dκI∗
<0
dτ
Under the parameter values that allow I to offer κ∗ , there are three factors that
favor S. The first of these is that the institutions are favorable to S, and thus, allow
her to bargain for a better division of the surplus. Secondly, S also gets a large
enough reduction in costs to justify entering a partnership with I. Finaly, the cost of
S’s investments are below a critical proportion of I’s costs. Under these parameter
values, then, I uses κ to enhance his bargaining position, and thus, raise his resulting
profits.
It is also of interest to examine the case where institutions do not favor S at all, or
τ = 0. Intuitively, under such conditions, I can take advantage of his bargaining power
to wrest control over the asset of S. However, recall once again that I benefits from
S’s investment. If τ = 0 and κ = 0, S has no incentive to invest in the partnership.
Further, if S has no bargaining power, she may decide to forego the partnership if
the payoffs cannot at least match the levels of profit that she could obtain with her
own resources. The following result suggests that I will offer an equal level of control
in the case that S has no bargaining power.
Proposition 3. When τ = 0, I chooses κI0 = 12 , which S accepts
Proposition 3 suggests that I’s incentive to wrest control over S’s land-holding is
muted by his interest in ensuring that S invests in the partnership. In order to get S
to do so, I uses κ to induce S to invest in the partnership.
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So far, the results obtained show that the relationship between S’s bargaining
power and I’s offers of control are ambiguous. On the one hand, when institutions
favor S, and when S’s costs are lower in the partnership, I uses κ to extract a higher
level of profits from the partnership. However, when institutions are completely in
favor of I, he offers a level of κ that gives equal control over S’s landholding so
that S has an incentive to invest. The ambiguity of this relationship is evident in
the following results on an institutional environment that gives S all the bargaining
power. The first of these suggest that even in the case where S has all the bargaining
power, I may wrest complete control over S’s landholding contingent on the cost
reductions introduced in the partnership.
Proposition 4. When τ = 1 and cA ≥ 2cS , S will accept an offer of κI1 = 0.
The reason for this result is that when the institutional environment is in completely in favor of S, I’s profits are decreasing. Thus, I would prefer to wrest complete
control over land so as to ensure higher levels of profit. Moreover, S already benefits from the cost reductions introduced by the partnership with I. Thus, she may
be willing to forego control over her landholding, since the cost reductions make a
partnership without control over land more viable than cultivating her holding on her
own.
When the cost reductions introduced by the partnership are small, however, I
needs to offer a level of control to S so that S can capture additional gains of the
surplus. This is because an offer of κ = 0 would not be lucrative from S’s point-ofview, and thus, would push her to reject I’s offer of κ. This intuition is summarized
in the following result:


Proposition 5. When τ = 1 and cA ∈ cS



8qS
(4qS +c2S qI2 )





, 2cS , S will accept I’s offer

of


κI1∗

1
1
= 1 −
2
cS q I

s



2cA c2S qI2 − 8qS (2cS − cA ) 
2cA
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. where κI1∗ ∈ (0, 1).
This result suggests that if the cost reductions introduced by the partnership are
small, I will have to offer some level of control to S that makes the partnership more
lucrative. This level of control, however would be in favor of I, since I has to enhance
his bargaining position to make the partnership lucrative.
The results from this section show that the relationship between the control over
land and bargaining power is not straight-forward. I can use offers of κ to enhance
his bargaining position, and induce S to invest in the partnership. This creates a
condition in which I tries to wrest control over S’s landholding if the institutional
environment favors S in terms of bargaining power. The ability of I to wrest control
over S’s landholding, however, is limited by the cost reductions that the partnership
introduces. If these cost reductions are small, I’s ability to wrest control over S’s
holdings are limited to intermediary values of κ.

3.4

The Smallholder’s Offer of Control

S has an interest in entering a partnership with I for two reasons. First, a partnership with I brings cost reductions that would enhance her ability to invest in
cultivation. Secondly, S may benefit from gaining some of the surplus coming from
I’s investments. In general however, Corllary 10 and equation (3.3) taken together
suggest that S faces the same tension in conceding levels of control over her landholdings. On the one hand, conceding some control to I gives I an incentive to invest
in the partnership. However, ceding control to I may result in lowering S’s capacity
to capture these gains.
If S is able to make a unilateral offer of κ, she will solve the following problem:
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maxκ ΠS (xN
S) =

Q2S
QI
+ QI1
2cS
cS

A
s.t ΠS (xN
S ) ≥ ΠS (xS )

(3.7)

and ΠI (xN
I ) ≥ 0

(3.8)

Equation (4.7) is S’s participation constraint which insures that S’s choice of κ ensures
that her payoff from the partnership will at least be as good as her payoff from
cultivating her holding on her own. Equation (3.8) is I’s participation constraint
which will ensure that S’s offer of κ will result in a payoff that is at least zero, which
I would get if he does not enter the partnership.
In general, S’s ability to make an offer of κ depends on the exogenous parameter
values of costs and institutional quality. The following result suggests that when the
level of institutional quality and costs preclude I from making a feasible offer of κ, S
can make an offer of κ.
3
,
4

Proposition 6. When τ >

cA >

2cS
,
τ2

and cS ∈



q 2 (1−τ )
q 2 (1−τ )2
cI S q2 τ 2 , cI S3q2 τ
I
I



then, I will

accept an offer of κS∗ made by S where κS∗ ∈ (0, 1), and

S∗

κ

−2(cI qS2 (1 − τ ) + cS qI2 τ )
=
cI qS2 (1 − τ )2 − 2cS qI2 τ 2

(3.9)

Proposition 6 gives a level of κ that S can offer under the following conditions:
(1) both S and I’s payoffs are convex in κ, thus, S would be optimizing. (2) The
participation of constraint of I is not binding under these conditions9 . (3) The required
range of τ is outside the range where I can make a feasible offer of κ under similar
conditions. This shows that within a range of parameter values, S can initiate a
partnership when I is unable to do so. As with the case of I, the range of parameter
values limit S’s ability to initiate a partnership by offering levels of control over her
9

See Appendix of Proofs.
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holdings. The institutions that govern the share of profits plays an important limiting
role, and we can examine its relationship to S’s offers of control.
3.4.1

Smallholder Case: Institutional quality and control

As we have seen in the results concerning I’s offer of κ, it does not immediately
follow that S will get a favorable level of control when the institutional quality governing the partnership favors S. The same holds true for S when she has the opportunity
to make an offer of κ.


Corollary 5. Whenever When τ > 34 , and cS ∈ cI

2 (1−τ )2
q 2 (1−τ )
qS
, cI S3q2 τ
qI2 τ 2
I



,

dκS∗
<0
dτ
The reason for this result is that under the conditions required by Proposition 6,
the institutional quality already favors S. Thus, in order to get I to enter a partnership, it is necessary for S to cede a certain level of control over her holdings to I.
By doing so, S gains from the reductions of costs in cultivation and from capturing
some of I’s investments. Outside the levels of τ and costs given in Proposition 6, it
is possible that offers of κ may rise with τ .
Similar to the case wher I can make unilateral offers of κ, low levels of τ do not
necessarily imply low levels of κ. Examining the situation where τ = 0 shows that
when S has the power to make unilateral offers of control, she has will not cede any
control to I:
Proposition 7. Whenever τ = 0, S offers κS0 = 1.
This result says that if the institutions governing the share of profits from the
partnership give S no power, S will not cede any control to I, given the opportunity
to make unilateral offers of κ. This is because if τ = 0, the gains from cost reductions
disappear, and S’s gains from the partnership come only through being able to capture
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some of the surplus from I’s and her own investment. Thus, she does not cede control
since control over her holdings will increase her disagreement payoff vis-a-vis I.
The opposite of this case is when the institutions governing the share of profits
within the partnership sre completely in favor of S. In this case, S woud be able
to capture all the surplus from the partnership above I’s and her own disagreement
payoffs. If so, I may not have an incentive to invest, unless given a sufficient level of
control. The following result confirms this intuition:
Proposition 8. Whenever τ = 1, S will offer κS1 = 21 , whenever
cA ≥

2
4cS qS
2)
2
2
(3cS qI −2qS

(cA −2cS )
2cS cA

> 0 or if

. Otherwise, S will not make an offer.

Thus, S will cede equal control over her holdings in order to get I to agree to a
partnership. In this case, the benefits to S would come through both cost reductions,
and a share of the total surplus. However, this offer is contingent on whether or not
the cost reductions introduced by a partnership are large enough. Otherwise, it may
not be feasible for S to enter into a partnership with I.
When either player is able to make unilateral offers of control, they face the task of
having to balance giving incentives so that their prospective partners agree to jointly
cultivate, and wresting control in order to wrest a greater level of payoffs. These two
objectives may mean that either offers a level of κ to compensate for unfavorable
institutional qualities, and cost constraints. The preceding results suggest that it is
not always the case that favorable institutions imply greater control. Further, the
ability to make unilateral offers may imply more advantageous outcomes for one
partner, vis-a-vis the other. How we can judge these outcomes is the subject of the
next section.

3.5

Comparison of Levels of Control

There are three reasons why either player would cede or wrest a certain level of
control over the landholding of S. For both players, offering a level of control in69

centivizes the other player to invest in cultivation. For I, offering a level of control
also allows him to gain access to the holding of S, from which he could derive profits. S on the other hand, can cede some level of control in order to take advantage
of cost reductions that the partnership brings. Finally, ceding control to a partner
may overcome constraints brought about by the institutional characteristics defined
by τ . Scholars who have written on land acquisition, for instance, have made claims
of adverse incorporation based on a loss of control (e.g. De la Cruz, 2012; Wilson,
1986). Losing control over land may mean losing a food source, a community, or a
home. In this framework, control is mainly a bargaining chip: the player who has
more control over land has a better bargaining position. The results in this paper
preclude these possibilities since offers of κ have to satisfy each players’ participation
constraint. However, if control is an important dimension by which to assess contractual arrangements, we can make this comparison by comparing (1) the resulting
levels of control, and (2) the resulting levels of payoffs. In this section, I will limit the
comparisons only for the cases that τ = 1, and τ = 0. This is because the levels of κ
found in Propositions (2), and (6) are possible under different levels of τ . However,
by comparing offers of κ under τ = 1, and τ = 0, the institutional environment that
governs the share of profits is fixed, and thus, we can understand how each player
fares under a partnership based on which player is in a position to make an offer of
κ.
Corollary 6. In the cases where τ = 0, and τ = 1, S’s levels of control are always
better for S when S is in a position to make an offer.
The preceding result suggests that if, indeed, there is an interest in maintaining
S’s control over her holding, then she must be able to make unilateral offers of κ,
and this should not be left to I. However, the ability of S to ensure that she has full
control over her land is conditional on a restricted set of parameter values, especially
within the context of a contract with I. Otherwise, no contracts will take place, or, I
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will be able to wrest control of S’s holdings if he is in a position to make unilateral
offers.
Arguably, however, the importance of maintaining control over land is secondary
to ensuring that the partnership generates gains for both S ad I. The results of this
paper preclude any possibility that offers of κ generate payoffs where either player is
worse-off as a result of entering a partnership. All of the results suggest that offers of
κ at least satisfy a participation constraint. However, comparing the resulting payoffs
in the extreme cases of τ = 0 or τ = 1 gives a partial answer to the question: if the
institutions that govern bargaining within the contract are completely in favor of one
partner, does the ability to make a unilateral payoff yield advantages? The following
result yields an answer:
Corollary 7. Comparing the resulting payoffs, we obtain that
1. Whenever τ = 1, S is indifferent as to whether she or I can make unilateral
offers of kappa. However, I can always do better when he is able to make a
unilateral offer of κ.
2. When τ = 0, entering a partnership is always better for both. However, S’s
payoffs are higher when she can make a unilateral offer of κ, and I’s payoffs are
higher when he is able to make unilateral a unilateral offer of κ.
Corollaries 7 and 6 suggest that if ensuring that S maintains some control over
her holdings is of paramount concern, then, she should always be given the ability
to make unilateral offers of κ. However, having this ability does not guarantee that
the partnership will make either player better off. In fact, under certain conditions, S
does no better under a partnership than she would had she cultivated her holdings on
her own. Thus, ensuring that S maintains control over her holdings does not imply
that she is made better off in doing so in terms of the level of payoffs she can achieve.
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Alternatively, a standard way of comparing outcomes is to use a utilitarian social
welfare function. That is, we compare the total utility of the S and I under the
different arrangements using:

N
Σ = ΠS (xN
S )|κ=κij + ΠI (xI )|κ=κij

(3.10)

where i ∈ {S, I}, j ∈ {0, 1}. Equation (3.10) yields a normative criteria: does giving
player I or S the ability to make unilateral offers of κ enhance total payoffs? The firstbest case where S and I can observe their partner’s investments, gives the greatest
level of total payoffs. However, under the condition that neither partner can observe
the other’s investments, the resulting outcomes in investment would be less than the
first-best. The utilitarian rule yields a way of assessing who should get the ability
to make unilateral offers of control based on the payoffs which resulting from the
levels of investment from the partnership. The following suggests that the answer is
conditional on τ .
Proposition 9. Under the utilitarian choice rule, when τ = 1, Σ is greater when I
has is able to make unilateral offers of κ. When τ = 0, Σ is greater when S is able to
make unilateral offers of κ.
The utilitarian criteria suggests that whenever the institutions which govern the
share of surplus from the partnership give no power to S, then total utility is maximized when S has the power to make unilateral offers of κ. When the institutions give
all the power to S, total utility is maximized when I can unilaterally make offers of
κ. However, we should note that under the latter, S’s gains from the partnership, at
best, come only through the cost reductions that the partnership brings. Otherwise,
S is no better off under a partnership.
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3.6

Conclusions and Discussion

This paper models the choice of ownership structure as a degree of control over
land- the asset without which no cultivation can occur. Past models of ownership
structure or control have modeled this choice in discrete terms: separately treating
complete ownership of one party over a firm or the assets involved in production.
My main innovation is that I have made this choice a matter of degree using the
parameter κ ∈ [0, 1]. This degree of control mirrors recent literature in institutional
economics and legal studies which argue that property rights are a set of abilities over
an asset. Thus, the degree of control (or possession) that a person has over an asset
such as land, within the context of a partnership, depends on what abilities in the
set of property rights an agent yields. This continuous framework is a departure from
previous models of firm integration that treat ownership structures as discrete types.
I examined how the level of control is determined through unilateral offers made
by an investor to a landowner. When this is the case, the institutional environment
favors the investorin the sense that his offer is final. Thus, the investor may have all the
bargaining power in determining levels of κ, even if he may have no bargaining power
once the contract is in place. I show that the degree of control depends on the costs
to each partner of investing in cultivation and the distribution of relative bargaining
power implied by the institutional environment that govern the partnership. The
model’s results suggest that institutional factors, interpreted as the distribution of
bargaining power, are not sufficient to ensure that landowners can maintain control
over their holdings. In fact, an institutional environment which completely favors S
may result in S losing control over her holdings if the costs of cultivation to S are
so high so as to make the cost reductions introduced in the partnership a lucrative
proposition. This suggests that policy-makers should be mindful of both economic
factors such as the costs to cultivation, and institutional factors in ensuring that
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smallholders that contract with investors are able to maintain a degree of control
over their holdings.
Similar results hold for the case where S is able to make unilateral offers of κ
with two significant differences. First, under some restricted levels of cost, S would
be able to offer a level of κ when τ is too large for I to do so. Further, when S has
the power to make unilateral offers of κ, she always maintains some degree of control
over her holding. This implies that policy advocates who assert that S should always
maintain control over her holdings should make interventions that allow S to make
unilateral offers of κ. However, this may not enhance the payoffs to S, and may not
be Pareto-preferred under situations where the institutions governing the partnership
favor S.
These results, however, should not be taken to mean that institutions governing
partnerships should be in favor of investors rather than smallholders. Being able to
ensure that smallholders maintain some degree of control over their holdings is a
matter of finding the right balance of costs to investments, bargaining power, and
given these factors assigning the rights to make offers of control. Indeed, we can think
of the right to make offers of κ as a type of event power- being able to affect the
bargaining position of one’s partner (Bartlett, 2006)10 . As the results suggest, the
assignment of power is ambiguous, and depend on the exogenous parameter values.
The current paper has limitations that I wish to address in later work. The first
of these is that the investments modeled in this paper are specific to each partner,
and thus, cannot be captured by either in case of a disagreement in bargaining.
Often, however, cultivation involves investments in physical capital which stays on
the landholding of S, and thus enhances the bargaining position or threat payoffs
10

Perhaps, another interpretation would be that S offers κ, and thus, giving I a degree of granted
event power- the ability to make a certain set of significant decisions in the future that may affect
the payoffs to S in the future.
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of each partner. A model accounting for both physical capital, and capital that is
unobservable to each player would then be a natural next step in treating the problem
of partnerships in cultivation.
A second limitation of the model is that it does not account for situations wherein
state-actors may be part of the bargaining process. In the current paper, there are
two instruments that can be used to affect the outcomes. The first is assigning the
right to make unilateral offers of κ and assigning the distribution of τ . Though these
partially model the policy framework that the players face in deciding the terms of
the partnership, they are exogenously given and do not respond to the decisions of the
investor and landowner. Often, however, policy-makers play a role in the outcomes of
an agribusiness investment deal. How they may anticipate or respond to the actions
of S and I would certainly be an interesting related problem to treat in the future.
Finally, this paper does not address how S and I can arrive at equilibrium levels
of κ through a bilateral bargaining procedure. The present paper treats their offers of
κ separately, implying that the contract can be defined by S or I alone, but neither
can make countr-offers. Modelling a bilateral bargaining procedure defining levels of
control would be another task for the future.11

11

One way such a bilateral process is done is what has been called a random-offers protocol (see,
e.g. ??) where one party can make a unilateral offer with some probability α, while the other can
make a unilateral offer with probability (1 − α).
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CHAPTER 4
EXPROPRIATION AND THE LOCATION OF
FARMLAND INVESTMENT: A THEORETICAL
INVESTIGATION INTO THE LAND RUSH

4.1

Introduction

Of late, land acquisitions have drawn the attention of scholars (see e.g. White
et al., 2012; Franco et al., 2012), and think tanks (see e.g. Anseeuw et al., 2012;
Colchester et al., 2011). Between 2007 and 2008, a rise in media reports of land acquisitions accompanied a dramatic rise in food prices (Anseeuw et al., 2012). While
scholars from political science (Hall, 2011), and development (Adam, 2013) have compiled case studies of land acquisitions, Deininger (2011), Deininger (2013), and Arezki
et al. (2013) used data from multiple countries to examine which factors determine
the likelihood of a country attracting more agricultural or farmland investments1 .
They find two consistently strong determinants: The availability of suitable land for
cultivation, and weak land-governance institutions, understood as the degree to which
a country upholds local land rights. The first of these is intuitive. Suitable land is
necessary for the cultivation of crops. The second one however, presents a puzzle.
On the one hand, a state that is willing to disregard smallholder rights may more
easily coerce land occupants into abandoning their holdings or accepting some form
of agribusiness partnership from which they derive little benefit. This would cheapen
1

The authors include other controls such as trade ties, colonial relations, and the yield gap- the
difference between current levels of productivity, and productivity given the application of capital
and technology. These and institutional factors were tested as determinants of how many agribusiness
projects located in a country.
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the cost for the investor. On the other hand, by taking advantage of these cost reductions, investors might forego benefits from greater security of property rights, as well
as greater returns due to more productive public investments, or other advantages
associated with stronger land-governance institutions.
This essay is an attempt to understand why this phenomenon emerges from the
recent land rush, in the context of investment for the cultivation of crops. Given the
observation that investors target countries with weak land-governance institutions,
what can one learn about the characteristics of the investment projects, and the characteristics of the target countries? Under what conditions do weak land-governance
institutions dominate the decision of an investor to locate? This essay provides a possible answer to these questions, focusing on an investor’s choice of location based on
his interaction with a smallholder. I present a game-theoretic model in which the investor can choose to expropriate a current land occupant should she refuse him access
to her holdings. By treating these issues theoretically, I provide reasons and conditions
that can help to explain empirically observed trends in recent land acquisitions.

4.1.1

Land Acquisitions and Land Governance

An investor’s decision to locate is often a matter of balancing centripetal and centrifugal forces (Dembour, 2008). Centripetal forces draw investors into a country. Such
factors include public goods (Pieretti and Zanaj, 2011), agglomeration advantages
(Haaland and Wooton, 1999; Konrad and Kovenock, 2009), and fiscal incentives such
as subsidies (Fumagalli, 2003). In land acquisitions, the existence public goods such
as roads and ports that ensure the delivery of crops can generate large productivity
advantages for the investor. Similarly, an investor may find agglomeration advantages
where there are related industries such as the existence of fertilizer suppliers, transport businesses, and processing and milling facilities. While outright subsidies do not
necessarily feature in land acquisitions, other modes of government assistance may
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be available to investors such as the identification of suitable land, and subsidies to
smallholders who allow agribusiness to access their holdings (Menguita-Feranil, 2013).
Centrifugal forces are forces that deter investors from locating in a country. Among
these are taxes (Pieretti and Zanaj, 2011; Herger et al., 2014), competitors (Bjorvatn
and Eckel, 2006), and other costs associated with production such as the strength of
bargaining power for labor (Davies and Vadlamannati, 2013).
Weak land-governance institutions, understood as the low degree to which local
land rights are upheld in a country (Arezki et al., 2013), act as a centripetal force
when the cost of obtaining use-rights to land refers to more than its nominal market
price. An investor may find weak land governance institutions attractive when these
make it easier for him to appropriate land cheaply because he can use the threat
of expropriation against a smallholder. This cost-reduction generates greater profits
for an investor, which may explain his preference for environments with weak land
governance2 . Indeed, many cases of recent land acquisitions suggest that investors are
able to take advantage of weak property rights institutions in obtaining land from
small farmers and indigenous communities3 .
According to the findings of Anseeuw et al. (2012), the regions most targeted
by land deals are in East Africa and Southeast-Asia. East Africa covers about 30
million hectares worth of land deals, and Southeast Asia covers about 15 million.4
Ethiopia alone accounts for about 10% of all the land deals in East Africa, while the
Philippines covers about one-third of the land deals in Southeast Asia. These land
deals are often directed toward the cultivation of biofuels and cash crops (Lavers, 2012;

2

Glaeser et al. (2003),Sonin (2003) theorize similar behaviors for wealthy actors who may prefer
weak property rights institutions.
3

Some may point out that weak land governance institutions may signal volatility of returns to
investment since investors might also suffer expropriation once they locate in a country. The data,
however, does not support this reasoning. Investor protections are not significant determinants of
investment location (Arezki et al., 2013).
4

The total stock of land deals worldwide is about 149 million hectares.
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Borras Jr et al., 2010). Rural inhabitants in both countries have had experience with
both coercive and consensual land deals leading to adverse incorporation, whereby
smallholders exchange use-rights to land for little to no compensation, employment,
or access to land (see e.g. Cramb and Curry, 2012; Borras Jr and Franco, 2013).
In the case of Ethiopia, for example, poor systems of titling in certain highland
regions create conditions under which groups inhabiting and using land cannot prove
their ownership or use-rights. Groups that use communal lands are easily coerced
by local governments to consent to lease agreements with investors resulting in the
loss of usufruct rights for much of the community (Lavers, 2012). In the Philippines,
beneficiaries of the country’s agrarian reform program are required to pay a supposedly fair price of the land they receive, as computed by the Land Bank of the
Philippines. This is much like a mortgage payment, and it is expected that beneficiaries complete these payments after ten years. Missing three years of payments can
result in default, after which, the Land Bank can evict the beneficiary. Often, these
payments are significantly higher than what cash-strapped, ex-landless laborers can
afford. Thus, several beneficiaries in the southern island of Mindanao have consented
to deals with oil-palm and cash crop investors (Menguita-Feranil, 2013)5 . Several
authors have compiled case studies and reports of similar expropriatory activities
happening elsewhere(see e.g. White et al., 2012; Cramb and Curry, 2012; Borras Jr
and Franco, 2013). These examples, combined with the finding that investors tend to
locate in countries with poor property rights regimes, yield evidence that investors
may be taking advantage of weak land governance institutions to cheapen the cost of
gaining land-use rights.
Why states allow weak land governance institutions to persist is a matter that I
do not treat in this paper. However, it is worth noting some reasons that weak land
5

These deals are often leases that last for decades. In some cases, they can last for more than
thirty years (Department of Agrarian Reform, 2006).
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governance institutions may persist. First, it is possible that the trends so far observed
in land acquisitions are responses to existing institutional frameworks which have not
had time to improve or develop. Promoting institutional reforms is an objective of
those who have collected case studies of land acquisitions. Second, maintaining weak
land governance institutions may serve the interests of local elites who may themselves
facilitate land acquisitions6 . Thus, politically powerful elites may choose to maintain
these institutions if they stand to benefit from land acquisitions or other extractive
activities (Lawson-Remer, 2014). Finally, states may see land acquisitions as a conduit
for rural development which can benefit a larger portion of the population(Cook and
Chaddad, 2000). Thus, governments may be making the calculation that weak land
governance for smallholders and minority communities will benefit the population at
large in the long-run.
The rest of the essay proceeds as follows. The next section presents a model
in which an investor decides to locate in a country chosen from a set of countries
N . The cost of location depends on the result of a possible contest with a current
landowner. The model exhibits elements of contest success discussed by Hirshleifer
(1989), Skaperdas (1996), and Van Long (2013). The structure of the decision process
is otherwise analogous to that in the models discussed above on investment location,
extended to n ≥ 2 countries. I will then conclude by discussing the implications of
my results, and possible extensions. The results are proven in Appendix B

4.2

The Model

Consider an Investor I making the decision to acquire land in a country i ∈
N = {1...n}, where N is the set of indices denoting the options of the investor. If he

6

Putzel (1992), for instance, argues that the formation of land reform laws in the Philippines was
the product of inter-elite negotiations explicitly excluding peasant organizations from the conversation. Many of the congress members in the Philippines were from landed families
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acquires land in some country i, I produces a level of revenue qIi > 0, where qIi ∈ R+ ,
which represents what the investor expects to gain from producing crops in country i
depending on upstream market conditions, advantages in supply, and the availability
of infrastructure in i7 . In order to acquire land in any of the i countries in N , I
needs to gain the consent of a landowner Si , who currently uses her land to produce
a level of revenue qSi 8 . I assume that 0 < qSi < qIi , which reflects the conventional
justification that farmland investment is supposed to generate more productive uses
for smallholder land9 .
To persuade Si to grant I use-rights to land, I offers Si a level of remuneration
Ri . If Si refuses to allow I to use land, I can choose to expropriate her. In order
to expropriate the landowner, I, invests in expropriation effort eIi , while Si invests
effort in defense, eSi . The contest is costly to both players, and this cost is determined
by the institutional characteristics of country i. Specifically, the per-unit cost to I’s
expropriation effort is given by a parameter 0 ≤ τi ≤ 1, which is a measure of the
strength of land institutions that protect the ownership of Si . The cost to Si , on the
other hand is given by (1 − τi ). Better institutional environments reduce the burden
of defense for the landowner in i while increasing the burden of expropriation on I 10 .
Should I win the contest, he gets to implement his project while the landowner gets
0. The opposite holds true in the case that the landowner wins. Success in defense
7

If an investor is an exporter who delivers crops to one country where the price of his crops are
set, then the revenue from locating in country i is qIi = ρψIi where ρ is the price of the crops, and
ψIi is the quantity that he can produce in country i given the various conditions in i.
8

Alternatively, we could think of these as a group of smallholders who bargain together.

9

see e.g. Colchester et al. (2011), and Borras Jr et al. (2010).We can relax this assumption, in
which case, it is possible the ability to expropriate may be IâĂŹs sole source of profits. However,
this would complicate matters since there would be no reason for states to attract I.
10
One may also use an alternative specification where landowners have a country-specific cost
borne by both the landowner (e.g. cSi ) and the investor, (say, cIi ). In this case, worse institutional
environemnets would mean higher costs. However, this framework does not enjoy the intuitive quality
that the institutional environment, while a possible bane for the landowner, can act as a boon for
the investor.
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and expropriation, respectively, are given by the following functions:

pSi (eSi , eIi ) =

For Si , and,
pIi (eSi , eIi ) =






eSi
eSi +eIi

if (eSi , eIi ) ≥ (0, 0)



 1
2

if (eSi , eIi ) = (0, 0)






eIi
eSi +eIi

if (eSi , eIi ) ≥ (0, 0)



 1

if (eSi , eIi ) = (0, 0)

2

Notice that pIi (eSi , eIi ) = 1 − pSi (eSi , eIi ). Further, each of these functions increase
in each player’s effort, and decrease in the opposing party’s effort level. Thus, we can
think of these functions as success probabilities, or, a proportion of a parcel of land
that can be won through the contest11 . The game is summarized by the following
sequence:
1. I chooses to invest in one of countries i ∈ N
2. Once I decides on a country, I must offer Si a level of remuneration Ri .
3. Si can then choose to either accept or reject Ri .
4. If the offer is rejected, I and Si , enter a contest. I chooses how much to invest
in expropriation eIi , while Si decides to invest in defense effort eSi .
5. If I is successful in expropriation, he will be able to reap profits from producing
qIi . On the other hand, if I is unsuccessful, he gets 0, while Si is able to produce
qSi .
I solve this game via backward induction. I first demonstrate the results from expropriation. This will serve as the fallback position for the landowner in country i. I then
deduce the level of profits that the investor can expect in each country i ∈ N , given
11

The functional form fits the general ratio-form of a contest success function (CSF) with a mass
effect parameter of 1. This suggests that there is diminishing returns to effort exerted on expropriation or defense(Hirshleifer, 1989).
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that country’s land governance characteristics defined by τi . Finally, I examine under
what conditions the investor will target the country with the lowest level of τi .
4.2.1

Expropriation and Adverse Incorporation

In deciding their respective levels of effort in defense and expropriation, S and I
solve the following optimization problems simultaneously:

maxeSi pSi (eSi , eIi )qSi − (1 − τi )eSi

(4.1)

maxeIi pIi (eSi , eIi )qIi − τi eIi

(4.2)

for Si , and

The optimization implies the following results for the effort levels:
Lemma 4. The optimization problem characterized by equations (4.1), and (4.2)
yield the following equilibrium level of efforts, and success.
• e∗Si = qIi τi ( qνSii )2 , with pSi (e∗Si , e∗Ii ) =

qSi τi
νi

• e∗Ii = qSi (1 − τi )( qνIii )2 , with pIi (e∗Si , e∗Ii ) =

qIi (1−τi )
νi

Where νi = qSi τi + qIi (1 − τi ).
These levels of effort are equivalent to a proportion of the rewards that the opponent of each player expects from engaging in expropriation. We can also make the
following observation:
Lemma 5. The following hold for the success probabilities:
1.

dpSi (e∗Si ,e∗Ii )
dτi

>0

2.

dpIi (e∗Si ,e∗Ii )
dτi

<0

Corollary 8. The expected payoffs from the expropriation round are
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2

r
• πSi
= qSi  qSiνiτi  for Si .



2

i) 
r
• πIi
= qIi  qIi (1−τ
for I in i.
νi

Corollary 9. (e∗Si , e∗Ii ) = (0, 0) is not an equilibrium.
The preceding corollary says that I always has an incentive to expropriate Si . It
r
is easy to show that πSi
< qSi 12 . The possibility of expropriation lowers the rewards

for the landowners. Since I needs to offer a level of remuneration Ri , he chooses Ri
to satisfy the following:
r
Ri ≥ πSi

(4.3)

Since there is no reason for I to offer a higher level of remuneration to Si than she
would get if she rejects the deal, we can assume that (4.3) holds with equality. This
shows that the capacity of I to expropriate Si compels Si to accept a level of remuneration that is lower than what she could produce on her own. Even if Si voluntarily
agrees to allow I to use her assets (in this case, land) for a productive activity, she
does so under an arrangement which may leave her no better or even worse-off than
she would have been otherwise. In effect, the investor’s ability to expropriate the
landowner, due to the existing institutional environment in the country allows him
to reduce the costs of location. The credible threat of expropriation, thus, allows
the investor to exercise a form of event power over the landowner by changing the
landowner’s fallback position, and thus lowering her payoffs (Bartlett, 2006).

4.2.2

Profits, and the Choice of Location

Given the derivations above, the resulting profits for I when he locates to i is
given by the following equation:
12

r
This is because pSi (e∗Si , e∗Ii ) < 1, and πSi
= qSi p2Si (e∗Si , e∗Ii ).
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2

qSi τi 
πIi = qIi − qSi 
νi

It is straightforward to show that the following holds:
Lemma 6.
dπIi
<0
dτ
The preceding Lemma states that the profits of the investor decrease with τ . This
result implies that, all else equal, the investor will choose the country where the
institutional protections for the landowners are poor. However, in keeping with the
literature on investment location, differences in productive advantages such as road
networks, existing infrastructure, and prices of labor can be stronger determinants
of I’s location decision, rather than the costs associated with obtaining land. Thus,
I should weigh differences in qIi against the differences in costs associated with τi
and qSi . It is necessary, then, to examine under what conditions can the ease of
expropriation overcome other disadvantages that a country i ∈ N may have against
other candidates in N .
In general, I chooses his location depending on where profits are greater. The
condition, then, for I to choose a country i ∈ N is given by the following criteria:


2



2

qSi τk 
qSk τk 
> qIk − qSk 
qIi − qSi 
νi
νk

(4.4)

For every k 6= i, k ∈ N . Equation (4.4) is a simple profit maximizing criteria. That
is, I chooses location i over k if his profits in i are higher than in k. Now, define
τm = min{τi |i ∈ N }. Given the observation that poor land governance, interpreted
in the model as τi , is a major driver in attracting farmland investment, it is necessary
to examine the conditions under which I chooses to locate in m due to the advantages
brought about by τm . We know that if I chooses m among the countries in the set N ,
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then, equation (4.4) has to hold for m and every country in the set N . If this is so,
then, if I locates in m despite the existence of countries where he could possibly gain
greater levels of revenue, this means that the reduction in costs due to the governance
institutions in m have to outweigh the benefits of added revenue anywhere else in
the set of possible locations N . Proposition 1, then suggests a possible conclusion
regarding the characteristics of the target countries in N given the behavior of an
investor I.
Proposition 10. If I locates in m For all j ∈ N, j 6= m such that qIj ≥ qIm , there
exists a k for which qIk ≥ qIm , and

qIj − qIm < qSk

Proposition 10 suggests that among the countries in N , I will locate in the country
where land governance institutions have the least regard for local land rights only if
the revenue differences between that country and any other country where the investor
can gain a higher level of revenue are small. The size of this difference is bounded
above by the revenue that some landowner (or group of smallholders) can produce
on their own in one of the countries where the investor can gain a higher level of
revenue. The intuition behind this result is that the ability to expropriate should
overcome any possible advantages in revenue that other countries in the set N may
offer. In choosing a location, the investor weighs the differences in revenue against
the differences in costs. In order for expropriation to be a relevant metric, it has to
be the case that the cost reduction from locating in a country with weak protections
for local landholders is greater than the opportunity cost of foregoing a higher level
of revenue. Otherwise, I would not locate in m.
One must make a distinction between equation (4.4) and Proposition 10. The
former states that I will choose country m among the countries in set N if he can
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gain a higher level of revenue in m than any other country in the choice set. This
condition applies to each individual country, but it does not yield any information
about the set of targeted countries as a whole, or, the intended investments which
make countries in N appropriate targets. Proposition 10 yields a threshold which
bounds the differences between revenue in a country m and all other countries i where
the levels of revenue are possibly higher than in m. In other words, the differences in
qIi are small enough so that the ease of expropriation becomes a relevant metric by
which I makes his choice of location.
In the context of the recent land rush, many investment projects are targeted toward producing food for the investor’s country of origin, or bio-fuel and flex-crops for
export (Hallam, 2011; Robertson and Pinstrup-Andersen, 2010). Thus, the expected
gains from the cultivation and sale of these crops may have a high degree of homogeneity. Under such circumstances cost considerations would dominate the choice of
location since the level of qIi depends on factors outside country i as well, such as the
price of crops. That is, if qIi = ρψIi where ρ is the price of the crops in the export
location, and ψIi is the quantity that he can produce in country i given the various
conditions in i, then, it has to be the case that ψIj − ψIm < qSk /ρ, for any country
where ψIj ≥ ψIm . ψIj − ψIm can be small when the countries targeted have little
by way of infrastructure and agglomeration advantages. Thus, the characteristics of
the target countries in terms of generating revenue may be very similar, making the
ability to expropriate an important determinant in the choice of location.
This result may also explain why Arezki et al. (2013) find that the yield gap does
not have a consistent effect on the choice of location. The yield gap is the difference
between the land’s current level of productivity, given agro-climactic conditions, and
the level it could achieve with the use of better capital, fertilizer, machinery, etc.This
would affect the choice of location if investors seek to take advantage of existing
activities by introducing capital, technology, and expertise. In other words, these
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are differences in qIj and qSj . Without expropriation, the game suggests that the
investor should pay a landowner the full value of her own cultivation qSj . If qIj is
high enough, it may justify the cost of offering Sj , Rj = qSj . However, with the
opportunity to expropriate landowners in another country m, the investor may find
that the opportunity cost of a higher level of revenue in country j could be offset
by lowering the payments to smallholders in m. Thus, the yield gap may not have
an effect on the choice of location because a place with a low yield gap, but with
excellent institutions may mean lower profits for I than a place with a low yield gap
but worse institutions.
The qualitative results from this section suggests that the trends in recent land
acquisitions are consistent with investors acquiring land for the cultivation of crops
of similar value. This would be the case for land acquisitions directed toward export
markets, or, food markets in the investor’s home country. The investor’s behavior
suggests that countries within the set of locations choices are similar enough so that
investors take advantage of cost reductions from their ability to expropriate. However,
once the investor locates to a country i, he may be subject to the same protections
as the landowner there. The next subsection addresses this issue.

4.2.3

Investor Insecurity

Weak land governance institutions can deter investments if the investor anticipates the possibility of losing qIi once he locates in i. Such an institutional deficiency,
can discourage, rather than encourage investments. We can think of property rights
volatility for I as reductions in qIi . In this case, I will have to weigh the anticipated risks of locating in i against the benefits of reduced costs due to the ease of
expropriation.
To model this problem, consider the possibility that once I obtains use-rights to
Si ’s land, then he anticipates that some other player in i designated as Ai will attempt
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to expropriate him. Let φi be the degree of investor protections in i where τi ≤ φi <
1∀i ∈ N . I define the bounds for φi so that I anticipates that he will have some
institutional guarantees, at least equivalent to that of landowners in country i. The
cost to I, then, of protecting his investment in i at any given period is (1−φi ). Should
Ai succeed in expropriating I, she produces qAi ∈ [qSi , qIi ]. I make this assumption
due to the following intuition: I’s investments may add value to the productivity of
land. However, this value may not include upstream markets which were available
to I. Thus, if Ai expropriates I successfully, then, she may be able to benefit from
whatever fixed costs that I put in place, but, she may not be able to take advantage
of upstream markets to which I may have had access.
The levels of success in expropriation and defense by Ai and I respectively are
given by the following functions, similar to the contest between I and Si :

pAi (eAi , eIi ) =

For Ai , and,






eAi
eAi +eIi

if (eAi , eIi ) ≥ (0, 0)



 1

2

if eAi = eIi = 0






eIi
eAi +eIi

if (eAi , eIi ) ≥ (0, 0)

pIi (eAi , eIi ) = 


 1

if eAi = eIi = 0

2

For I. A similar process of optimization as defined previously leads to the following
results:
Lemma 7. When I faces a certain level of property rights volatility in country i, φi ,
his revenue, qφi Ii is given by:


qIφi

2

qIi φi 
= qIi 
vi

Where vi = qIi φi + qAi (1 − φi ).
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(4.5)

As with the case of the landowner’s payoffs, we can deduce that

dqφi Ii
dφi

> 013 . The

expected profits of I from locating in i is given as:


πIφi

2

qSi τi 
= qIφi − qSi 
νφi

Where νφi = qSi τi + qIφi (1 − τi ). The general condition for I to choose m which
τm = min{τi |i ∈ N } over any i ∈ N is given, then, by:


2



2

qSm τm 
qSi τi 
> qIφi − qSi 
qIφm − qSm 
νφm
νφi

(4.6)

One can see that the results from the previous section continue to hold, with some
qualitative differences due to institutional protections for I (φi ), and the expected
payoffs of Ai (qAi ).
A case of particular interest is when qAi = qIi , and qIi = qI ∀i ∈ N . This case can be
understood as follows: the investor anticipates that he will be able to take advantage
of the same productivity in all counties in the set of options N . However, his expected
payoffs from locating in country i fall due to poor investor protections given by φi .
So, I faces the risk of losing his investments to Ai , who, I anticipates, would undergo
expropriation to gain the full value qI . There are a variety of contexts where such
a calculation is relevant. For example, it may be the case that I anticipates the
possibility of confiscation due to nationalistic laws which prevent him from owning
land. Or, he might anticipate the election of a government in i that is hostile to
foreign investors. Given this context, (4.5) becomes qI φ2i , since vi = qI . Assume that
∀i ∈

N, qIi φ2i



> qSi

qSi τi
νφi

2

, so that profits are positive in any country i in the set N .

We can rewrite (4.6) as:

13

Specifically,

dqφi Ii
dφi

= 2φi qAi ( qvIi )3
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2



2 

q τ
q τ
1
qSm  Sm m  − qSk  Sk k  
φm − φk >
qI (φm + φk )
νφm
νφk

(4.7)

Which is the general condition for I to choose m, for which τm = min{τi |i ∈ N }. The
next result is analogous to Proposition 10, and is proven using equation (4.7).
Corollary 10. Let m denote the country for which τm = min{τi |i ∈ N }. If qAi = qIi ,
and qIi = qI ∀i ∈ N , then I chooses m over all i ∈ N, i 6= m if and only if for every
i ∈ N , equation (4.7) holds, and, for every j ∈ N such that φj > φm , there exists a
β < 1 such that φj − φm < β
Corollary 10 states that when I anticipates some level of expropriation, given
that the only advantages he may anticipate in any country i are due to investor
protections, then, I chooses a country with the weakest local land governance τm ,
if he believes that any other country’s advantage in offering investor protections are
small. This corollary illustrates a limit to the volatility that investors are willing to
take when making their choice of location. Countries with insecure property rights for
local landowners and smallholders may be attractive, to the extent that the investor
can expect some relative institutional stability. This is why they may target countries
with poor land governance institutions, but with governments that can guarantee,
with some certainty, that their investments are safe. Corollary 10 may also explain
why certain countries which exhibit high property rights insecurity are not the targets
for land acquisition. It may be because the level of insecurity in countries where there
are high-intensity conflicts are too pronounced, so as to make the cost advantage of
acquiring land negligible. This result is consistent with (Arezki et al., 2013) who find
that investor protections are not a significant determinant of farmland investment.
What my result suggests is that this may be due to the fact that the group of countries
that investors target may be similar enough so that such considerations are irrelevent
to the choice of location. The results imply that I will not choose countries which
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cannot guarantee a certain level of investor protections. However, he may choose
relatively weaker investor protections if the reductions in the cost of location outweigh
the relative gains due to investor protection.
The previous results are based on the assumption that there are differences in
the institutional environment for I and Si . However, there may be reasons to think
that investors account for τi as their own risk factor as well. In the empirical exercises that explored the land rush, the institutional factors in some of the databases
were generated by surveying businessmen and bankers (Arezki et al., 2013)14 . These
institutional factors include things such as the number of land disputes and the adjudications resulting in land transfers. Thus, investors may not necessarily expect
that they will face a different institutional environment in a country i from Si . Under
what conditions, then, would investors choose to locate in countries with poor property rights governance, if they anticipate the same level of vulnerability as current
land-owners in i? The next two results suggest a partial answer to the question, where
investors anticipate gains from producing qI in all countries, and differences in the
level of revenue are due solely to differences in τi .
Corollary 11. Let m denote the country for which τm = min{τi |i ∈ N }. If qAi = qIi ,
and qIi = qI ∀i ∈ N , then I chooses m over all i ∈ N, i 6= m if and only if for every
i ∈ N , equation (4.7) holds, and, for every i ∈ N there exists a βτ < 1 such that
τi − τm < βτ
These last corollaries are proved in the same fashion as Proposition 10. These
results suggest that when I expects to face the same institutional environment as
Si , he may still choose to locate in the country where the institutional quality is the
lowest, if, the range of τi is small enough to ensure that he gains from the ease of
location. Thus, there is a degree of institutional proximity among the set of countries
14

The paper also includes a thorough online appendix which describes the data.
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N that justifies choosing the country with the poorest property rights governance.
Corollary 4 addresses the traditional view that property rights volatility may dampen
incentives to invest. Volatility in property rights subjects investment to risks that
can lower their expected returns. However, if I decides to invest in m, then, the
characteristics of land governance among the countries in the set N , measured by τ
are similar enough.
To better understand these results, one can classify target countries in terms of
the degree to which they protect investors and smallholders. Figure 4.1 presents this
classification in τ − ψ space. On the lower-left-most point is where neither investors
and smallholders are protected (τ = 0, ψ = 0). On the opposite end on the top-rightmost point is where both smallholders and investors are equally well protected with
(τ = 1, ψ = 1). Along the dotted 450 line where point E is located, is the region where
smallholders and investors receive equal protections (τ = ψ). Countries located below
this line such as point B are countries that are pro-investor since τ < ψ, and above
the dotted line where point A lies are what we can call relatively pro-poor regimes
since τ > ψ.
Proposition 10 pertains to the case where the set of target countries are located
in the bold line at the far-right of Figure 4.1. Along this line, investors will choose
the country where τ is lowest based on the levels of expected revenue. In the regions
where B and A are located, Corollary 10 gives a partial answer: when the differences
in expected revenue are due merely to differences in ψ, then I will locate in the
country where τ is the smallest only when the levels of ψ are close enough. Corollary
11 suggests that when the target countries are all located on the dotted line, and if
the differences in revenue are due solely to τ , then, I chooses the country with the
lowest level of τ if the levels of τ across all the target countries are similar enough.
If the choice set is N = {A, E, B}, and if qA = qE = qB , then, when I locates in B,
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Figure 4.1: A possible taxonomy of target countries according to the extent that they
protect smallholder land-rights (τ ) and investor land-rights (ψ)
τ

τ=1, φ=1

τ =φ

τ >φ
A

C
E
B

τ <φ
τ =0, φ=1
φ

τ=0, φ=0

this means that the levels of ψ or institutional protections for I are similar enough
among the three countries.

4.3

Implications and Conclusion

Empirical investigations into the determinants of recent land acquisitions find
that the quality land governance, interpreted as the degree to which local land rights
are respected, has a negative and significant impact on the likelihood of farmland
investment locating in a given country. This finding is counter-intuitive, considering
the literature on property rights and the location of investment. The literature on
property rights suggests that poor property rights regimes may introduce disincentives
to invest, due to reductions in the anticipated benefits. The literature on investment
location shows that investors do not necessarily choose countries where institutional
weaknesses allow them to gain cost advantages. Rather, investors choose countries
that offer productivity and supply chain advantages.
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Despite these findings from past literature, however, numerous case studies have
elucidated the role of expropriatory activity in land-acquisitions for farmland investments. In this essay, I have shown that under some circumstances, the ability to expropriate can explain why investors may favor countries with poor land-governance. The
benefits of choosing a country with poor land governance allows an investor to gain
access to land at a lower cost. Expropriation, or its threat, compels local landowners
to accept levels of remuneration that are worse than what they could have achieved,
given the resources at their disposal. Scholars have dubbed this result adverse incorporation. Adverse incorporation tends to occur when land deals arise without free,
prior, and informed consent, or when land institutions leave room for expropriatory
activity. There have been numerous studies on the link between foreign investment
and repression. Harms et al. (2002), Busse (2004), and Busse et al. (2011) find that
the link is negative. Greater democratic rights are linked with higher levels of FDI.
On the other hand Sorens and Ruger (2012) find a positive link between FDI and
repression, but one that is statistically insignificant. In the context of the land rush,
investors may not be engaging in violent activities per se. As the cases that I cited
in Ethiopia and the Philippines show, these methods of obtaining land involve taking
advantage of land governance institutions that make smallholder rights insecure. Put
another way, the costs in expropriation contests may be very low for I and very high
for SIi . In the model, expropriation need not occur. Only its credible threat is necessary for landowners to accept levels of remuneration that leave them no better-off, or
even worse-off, than they would have been otherwise.
The results of the paper demonstrate that the empirical findings from the literature on farmland investment may reflect growing demand for certain crops, rather
than a secular trend in agricultural investment. Investors will favor countries where
expropriation cheapens the cost of location, only if their expected revenues in the set
of countries they are targeting are close enough to merit a decision based on cost
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reductions. This implication should give some reason for optimism. There is a limit
to how much a country’s willingness to disregard land-rights can attract investors.
These limits are set by other factors that can contribute to increases in an investor’s
expected revenue. Thus, the findings from the literature on investment location are
relevant and complimentary to the findings of this model. There are many ways to
attract investment, and these need not involve taking advantage of institutional weaknesses. However, these other means of attracting investment may entail spending on
public goods such as roads and ports. If a country faces tight budget constraints,
attracting investment by any means necessary can be quite appealing. The problem
of how a government ought to make these decisions, and how it sets a country’s
institutional characteristics is one of interest. Such an exercise may prove to be an
interesting and difficult problem in the context of land acquisitions. This is because
land acquisitions, in the context of farmland investment, may be a question not only
of payments, but of types of arrangements that current land-users would face after
the acquisition. They may end up working under the investor, or even growing crops
for him. Thus, governments may face the problem of setting both the institutional
environment for acquisition, and bargaining after the acquisition takes place.
This paper also points out that policy makers should be cautious about farmland
investments. If these investments seek to take advantage of weak property rights institutions, then they may not be able to generate the productivity gains that are often
used to justify their attraction. If the objective of attracting farmland investments
is to increase agricultural productivity and raise the welfare of rural smallholders,
then states should ensure, at the very least, that there is a suitable environment for
smallholders to bargain with investors. This may entail a rigorous strengthening of
existing informal and formal land institutions in order to ensure the welfare of all parties which have a stake in the acquisition of land. States may also monitor whether
jobs and infrastructure, often promised in a land deal, actually materialize within

96

a reasonable amount of time. The problem, however, is that states may depend on
these deals to raise revenue, and that attracting investment per se can become the
objective rather than ensuring its positive spillovers in job creation and infrastructure
development. In this case, states may fail to monitor investments and may consent
or turn a blind eye to expropriatory activity. Once again, a definite answer to this
would entais explicitly modelling the state as a player in the game, with its own set
of motivations and strategies.
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CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSION

This dissertation identifies factors that explain certain outcomes arising from
smallholder incorporation and land-acquisition. My field work among ARBs in the
Davao Region demonstrates the need for both economic and institutional reforms.
Besides providing affordable credit, crop insurance, and infrastructural investments,
I argued that states should make institutional reforms. These include providing legal assistance and consultation to ARBs, consulting with ARB representatives, and
partnering with pro-reform organizations. These measures would not only help ARBs
in deciding and bargaining better contracts, but also, provides a ready avenue for
advocacy should contentions regarding AVA contracts arise.
The second essay departs from the use of discrete control structures in contracting
and conceptualizes control as a matter of degree. By doing so, I show how a variety of
contractual outcomes, including contracts where smallholders effectively lose control,
can arise even from consensual transactions. These outcomes are determined by the
costs of inputs, and the bargaining power that the partners have in defining the
degree of control resulting from the contract. I show that under certain conditions,
the smallholder would accept a contract where she completely cedes control of her
land, and she is left no better off than what she could have achieved without the
investor. My model also shows how targetting the cost constraints that smallholders
face can reduce the scope for investors to offer contracts where they can wrest control
of land from smallholders. Finally, I also show how giving smallholders the ability to
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decide on the level of control in a contract can ensure that they can maintain some
level of control over their holdings, even when costs of inputs are high.
The third essay situates observed trends from land acquisitions within the tradition of location choice in international investment. I also introduce power-given by
the ability to expropriate- as a possible motivation for investors. My results suggest
that investor behaviors in land acquisitions signal that the countries they target fall
within a limited range of institutional and economic differences. They either expect
similar levels of revenue, or, they expect similar levels of institutional protections
for their investments. My model also further reinforces a well-known result in the
literature on property rights- weak protections for property rights can result in smallholders doing no-better or even worse-off as a result of expropriatory activity. This is
result is corroborated by numerous case studies in land acquisition. Taken together,
these findings suggest that attracting agribusiness investment may harm the interests
of smallholders, contrary to the optimistic assessments by economists and development institutions. However, these outcomes are only conditional, and countries have
other means of attracting investment so that investors would not have an incentive to
take advantage of the ability to undertake expropriatory actions. These may include
productive public investments that generate greater income for both investors and
smallholders.
In addition to these contributions, a logical next step would be to explore how
states set the contracting environment for incorporation. In this dissertation, I have
taken this environment as exogenous to the process. However, if states find it desirable
to attract agribusiness investment, then their decision process may not be independent
of the outcomes from contracting between investors and smallholders. What incentives
do states face? What factors do states weigh in setting the bargaining environment?
How do they weigh different avenues to attract investment? These are the questions
that I would like to pursue in future research.
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APPENDIX A
PROOFS OF RESULTS FROM CHAPTER 3

PROOF of Lemma 4: Taking the first-order conditions,
dΠA
S
= q S − cA x S = 0
dxS
Which yields
xA
S =

qS
cA

plugging this into ΠA
S (x) gives the result.4
PROOF of Lemma 5: The first order conditions are:
dΠF B
= q I − cI x I = 0
dxI
dΠF B
= q S − cS x S = 0
dxS
The results follow from this.4
PROOF of Lemma 6: Solving the maximization problem yields: −(1−τ )(q(x)−
RS − DI )−τ (RS − DS )τ + τ (RS − DS )(τ −1) (q(x) − RS − DI )(1−τ ) = 0 which can be
rearranged to obtain:
RS = DS + τ (q(x) − DI − DS )
Consequently, the payoff to I from bargaining is:

RI = DI + (1 − τ )(q(x) − DI − DS )

Using the definitions for q(x), DI , and DS , we can obtain the folowing:
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• RS = κqS (xS ) + τ ((qI xI + qS xS ) − (1 − κ)qI xI − κqS xS )
• RI = (1 − κ)qI (xI ) + (1 − τ )((qI xI + qS xS ) − (1 − κ)qI xI − κqS xS )
Rearranging these yield the results. 4
PROOF of Proposition 10: Using equations (4.1), and (4.2)the first order
conditions for S and I respectively are given by:
dΠS
= Q S − cS x S = 0
dxS
and
dΠI
= QI − cI xI = 0
dxI
These, in turn, yield the result. 4
PROOF of Corollary 9: κ(1−τ )+τ = (1−κ)(1−τ ) < 1, and 1−κτ < 1, κτ < 1,
and 0 < (1 − (κ(1 − τ ) + τ )) < 1. So,

QS < qS , and QI < qI

4
PROOF of Corollary 10:
dQI1
dκ

dQS
dκ

= qS (1 − τ ),

dQI
dκ

= −qI τ ,

dQS1
dκ

= −qS (1 − τ ),

= qI τ 4

PROOF of Proposition 2: For what follows, Let T1 = qI2 τ , T2 = qS2 (1 − τ ),
T3 = qS2 (1 − τ )2 , T4 = qI2 τ 2 . This Proof has several steps:
1. I chooses κ∗ : We can rearrange equation (4.4) as

ΠI (xN
I ) =

1
(kI + dI κ + aI κ2 )
2cS cI

(A.1)

Where kI = qI2 + 2cI τ (1 − τ ), dI = −2cS T1 + 2cI T2 , and aI = cS T4 − 2cI T3
Since ΠI (xN
I ) is a quadratic, to ensure that I is maximizing profits, it has to be
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the case that aI < 0. This is true given that cS < 2cI

2 (1−τ )2
qS
.
qI2 τ 2

Differentiating

equation (A.1), we get
dΠI (xN
I )
= bI + 2aI κ = 0
dκ
which yields:
κ∗ =

−dI
2aI

Plugging in the values for dI , and aI gives the result.
2. κ∗ ∈ (0, 1) for some value of cS : For κ∗ > 0 it has to be the case that dI > 0 and
aI < 0. This is true whenever cS < cI

2 (1−τ )
qS
qI2 τ

and cS < 2cI

2 (1−τ )2
qS
,
qI2 τ 2

respectively.

κ > 1 when 2aI > −dI or
cI qS2 (1 − τ ) − qI2 cs τ < 2cI qS2 (1 − τ )2 − qI2 cs τ 2
2

qs τ
. This is possible only if τ > 21 .
only if cS < cI q2 (2τ
−1)
I

A
3. S accepts the offer: Similar to I, we can write ΠS (xN
S ) − ΠS (xS ) as

kS + dS κ∗ + aS κ∗2

Where kS =

2 (c τ 2 −2c )
qS
A
S
,
2cS cA

(A.2)

dS = 2(cI T2 + cS T1 ), and aS = cI T3 − 2cS T4 . To ensure

A
∗
that ΠS (xN
S ) − ΠS (xS ) ≥ 0, meaning S accepts the offer of κ , it has to be the

case that:
ΠS (xN
S ) = kS +

1
−dI
dS
2cS cI
2aI








+ aS

−dI
2aI

2 

≥0

Note that since cS > cI TT43 , aS < 0, which means that S’s profit function is a
concave quadratic in κ. Rearranging yields:


−dI
2aI



2dS aI − aS dI
2aI
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≥ −2cS cI kS

(A.3)

Note that dS > dI . By the bounds on cS , aS < aI , since 2cS T4 −cI T3 < 2cI −cS T4
when cS < cI TT34 . Both these facts imply that:
2dS
aS
>
dI
aI
and thus
2dS aI − aS dI > 0
so that the left-hand side of equation (A.3) is positive. By the assumption on
cA , the right-hand side of equation (A.3) is negative. This implies that the
participation constraint does not bind. Thus, S accepts κ∗
4. Finally, we prove that the condition for aS < 0, aI < 0, dI > 0 are consistent
given τ ∈ ( 21 , 23 ) since cI

2 (1−τ )
qS
2qI2 τ

is the least upper bound for cS : From the previous

steps, cS is bounded above by:
• B1 = cI

2 (1−τ )2
qS
2qI2 τ 2

• B2 = 2cI
• B3 = cI

2 (1−τ )2
qS
qI2 τ 2

2 (1−τ )
qS
qI2 τ
2

qs τ
• B4 = cI q2 (2τ
−1)
I

Certainly, cI
2 (1−τ )
qS
qI2 τ

2 (1−τ )2
qS
2qI2 τ 2

. Finally,


for all cS ∈ cI

< 2cI

(1−τ )
τ

2 (1−τ )2
qS
.
qI2 τ 2

< 1 for τ >

2 (1−τ )2
qS
2qI2 τ 2

, cI

2 (1−τ )
qS
qI2 τ



τ<
1
2

dT1
dτ

= qI2

•

dT2
dτ

= −qS2

•

dT3
dτ

= −2qS2 (1 − τ )

implies that

τ
(2τ −1)

> 2 and

2 (1−τ )2
qS
2qI2 τ 2

<

Thus, B1 < B3 , and B3 < B2 < B4 . Thus,

, κ∗ ∈ (0, 1) is an acceptable offer for S.4

PROOF of Corollary 4: Notice that,
•

2
3
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•

dT1
dτ

= 2qI2 τ

Implying that

∂dI
∂τ

∂aI
∂τ

= −cI qS2 − cS qI2 < 0

= −4cI qS2 (1 − τ ) − 2cS qI2 < 0. Thus

dκ
−1 ∂dI
∂aI
= 2
aI − dI
dτ
2aI ∂τ
∂τ




The term in brackets is positive, yielding the result.4
PROOF of Propositon 3: When τ = 0, kI = qI2 cS , dI = 2qS2 cI , and aI = −2qS2 cI .
This shows that I is solving a maximization problem so that we can use equation (3.6),
obtaining κ∗ = 21 . Since τ = 0, kS =

2
−qS
, dS
cA

= 2qS2 cI , aS = qS2 cI . The payoff to S, can

be written as:
ΠS (xN
S) =

qS2 cI
q2
+ qS2 cI − S
4
cA

or
2
ΠS (xN
S ) = qS



1
5cI
−
4
cA



≥0

since cA , cI > 1.4
PROOF of Proposition 4: When τ = 1, kI = qI2 cS , dI = −2qI2 cS , and aI = qI2 cS .
Thus, we can write equation (A.1) as:

2
2
ΠI (xN
I ) = qI cS (1 − κ)

This function is greatest at κ∗ = 0 When τ = 1, kS =
aS = −2cS qI2 , and the payoffs to S will be

ΠS (xN
S) =

qS2 (cA − 2cS )
≥0
2cS cA

And thus, S accepts. 4
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2 (c −2c )
qS
A
S
,
2cS cA

dS = 2cS qI2 , and

S
PROOF of Proposition 5: First, algebraic manipulation shows that cS ( (4qS8q
)<
+c2 q 2 )
S I

2cS when

2c2S qI2

> 0. If I offers κ = 0, S’s payoff is negative. Thus, the offer of κ needs

to satisfy:
kS + dS κ + aS κ2 = 0
. Using the quadratic equation, and the values of aS , dS , kS , with τ = 1, we get:


1
1
κ = 1 ±
2
cS q I

s



2cA c2S qI2 − 8qS (2cS − cA ) 
2cA

This is real-valued when the discriminat is positive or if 2cA c2S qI2 ≥ 8qS (2cS − cA ) or
if cA ≥ cS



8qS
(4qS +1c2S qI2 )



Let,

1
1
κ+ = 1 +
2
cS q I



s

2cA c2S qI2 − 8qS (2cS − cA ) 
2cA





s

2cA c2S qI2 − 8qS (2cS − cA ) 
2cA

and
1
1
κ− = 1 ±
2
cS q I



Clearly, since the discriminat is at least 0, κ+ > 0. Manipulation κ+ ≤ 1 if cA ≥ cS ∈


S
cS ( (8qS16q
+2c2S qI2 )





, 16qS cS

Simple manipulation shows that κ− > 0 since −8qS (2cS −

−

cA ) < 0 < 1. Further, κ ≤ 1 for cA > cS


shows that cS

4qS
(2qS +c2S qI2 )





< cS



8qS
(4qS +c2S qI2 )

4qS
(2qS +c2S qI2 )





. Finally, algebraic manipulation

. Finally, κ+ > κ− since both are positive,

real-valued numbers. Since I’s payoff is maximized at κ = 0, he chooses κ− . 4
PROOF of Proposition 6: This proof will proceed in several steps. For what
follows, we use T1 = qI2 τ , T2 = qS2 (1 − τ ), T3 = qS2 (1 − τ )2 .
1. S is maximizing profits: For S’s problem to be a maximization, aS < 0. This is
true whenever cS ≥

T3
2T4

will choose κ to maximize his profits, thus solving

kS + dS κ∗ + aS κ∗2
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(A.4)

The assumption that cA >

2cS
τ2

ensures that kS > 0. Optimizing on equation

(A.4), we obtain:
κS∗ =

−dS
2aS

+T2
T3
. κS∗ < 1 when cS > −cI TT13 −T
. Since cS > 0, κS∗ < 1.
κS∗ > 0 when cS > cI 2T
4
4

2. S’s participation constraint does not bind given this choice of κS∗ since kS > 0:
This is true since

ΠS (xN
S ) = kS + dS



−dS
2aS





+ aS

−dS
2aS

2

≥0

Which can be simplified as
kS ≥ 0
Which is always true by assumption.
3. I will accept this level of κS∗ when cS > cI TT43 : The offer of κS∗ will have to
satisfy:
ΠI (xN
I )



= kI + dI

−dS
2aS





+ aI

−dS
2aS

2

≥0

Rearranging this, we get:



kI +

−dS
2aS



2dI aS − aI dS
2aS



kI > 0. Thus, if the second term is positive, the participation constraint does
not bind. This is true whenever
2dI
aI
>
dS
aS
This is true whenever cS <

T2
,
3T1

andcS > cI TT34 which guarantees that 2dI > dS ,

and aI < aS .
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Finally, this choice of κS∗ is consistent with I’s payoff being concave in κ if
cS < 2cI TT34 .
4. cS ∈ (cI

2 (1−τ )2 q 2 (1−τ )
qS
, S3q2 τ )
qI2 τ 2
I

and τ >

3
4

satisfy the bounds implied by the preceding

steps. The preceding steps imply the following bounds:
• cS ≥

T3
2T4

= B1S

• cS <

T2
3T1

= B2S

• cS > cI TT34 = B3S
• cS < 2cI TT43 = B4S
It is evident that B1S < B3S < B4S . Since τ > 43 , algebraic manipulation shows
that B4S > B2S whenever τ > 35 . Finally, B2S > B3S when τ > 43 . This shows that
the assumptions on τ and cS yield consistent bounds.4
PROOF of Corollary 5: First, note that
•

∂dS
∂τ

2cI
•

∂aS
∂τ

= 2(−2cI qS2 + cS qI2 ) < 0 since, τ >
2 (1−τ )2
qS
qI2 τ 2

3
4

which implies that cS < cI

2 (1−τ )
qS
3qI2 τ

<

q2

< 2cI qS2
I

= −2cI T2 − 2qI2 τ < 0

Thus,
dκS∗
−1
=
dτ
4a2S




∂dS
∂aS
aS − dS
∂τ
∂τ



<0

Since, under the assumptions, aS < 0 and dS > 0. 4
PROOF of Proposition 7: When τ = 0, aS = cI qS2 , dS = 2cI qS2 , and kS =
This implies that S’s payoffs can be written as:

cI qS2 (κ2

qS2
+ 2κ) −
cA
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2
−qS
.
cA

which is an increasing function for all values of κ ∈ [0, 1]. Thus, S chooses κ = 1.
Further this implies that S’s payoff is:

qS2 (3cI −

1
)>0
cA

This offer is acceptable to I since his payoff will be qI2 cS > 0 4.
PROOF of Proposition 8: When τ = 1, aS = −2cI qS2 , dS = 2cS qI2 , kS =
2 (c −2c )
qS
A
S
2cS cA

Since aS < 0, S is optimizing so κS∗ = 12 . Thus, the payoff to S is:
3cS qI2
+ kS ≥ 0
4

when kS > 0 or if cA ≥

2
4cS qS
2)
(3c2S qI2 −2qS

Otherwise, the participation constraint is binding

and we can use the quadratic formula which yeilds:

κ=

v
u
u
qS2 (2cS
t
1± 2−

− cA )
2
2qI cS cI cA

This is feasible when 4qI2 cS cI cA > qS2 (2cS − cA ) which is true since cS , cI , cA > 1 Now,
consider
κ− =
κ− > 0 only if cA <

2cS
2
cS cI qI2 +qS

v
u
u
q 2 (2cS
1 − t2 − S

− cA )
2
2qI cS cI cA

which cannot be true since cA > cS . Consider

κ+ =

v
u
u
q 2 (2cS
1 + t2 − S

− cA )
2
2qI cS cI cA

. Since κ+ > 1, no offers will be made since the upper bound of κ is 1. 4
PROOF of Corollary 6:This follows from comparing corresponding cases. When
τ = 0, I offers κI0 =

1
2

< 1 = κS0 which is what S would offer. When τ = 1,

There are two possibilities. Either S’s participation constraint is binding, or, it is not.
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The case where S participation constraint is given by κI1∗ and κS1∗ . It is clear that
κI1∗ < κS1∗ = 1, within a limited range of parameter values. Finally, whenerver if the
participation constraint does not bind, 0 = κI1 < κS1 = 12 . 4
PROOF of Corrollary 7: Note that when τ = 1:

2 2
2
ΠS (xN
S ) = 2cS qI κ − 2cS qI κ +

qS2 (cA − 2cS )
2cS cA

while
2
2
ΠI (xN
I ) = qI cS (1 − κ)

There are two possibilities for S’s offer. First, when κS1 = 12 ,

ΠS (xN
S )|κ=κS1 =

qS2 (cA − 2cS )
2cS cA

and
ΠI (xN
I )|κ=κS1 =

qI2 cS
4

When I can make unilateral offers, κI1 = 0, so

ΠS (xN
S )|κ=κI1 =

qS2 (cA − 2cS )
2cS cA

and
2
ΠI (xN
I )|κ=κI1 = qI cS
N
N
N
Certainly: ΠS (xN
S )|κ=κI1 = ΠS (xS )|κ=κS1 while ΠI (xI )|κ=κI1 > ΠI (xI )|κ=κS1 The

other possibility is that S does not offer, or that I offers κ to satisfy S’s participation
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constraint. Under these offers, S’s payoffs are the same. However, I gets a positive
level of payoffs if he can make a unilateral offer since κI1∗ < 1. When τ = 0

2
2 2
ΠS (xN
S ) = 2cS qI κ + cS qI κ −

qS2
cA

and
2
2
2
2
ΠI (xN
I ) = 2qS cI κ − 2qS cI κ + qI cS

If S makes a unilateral offer, κS0 = 1


2
ΠS (xN
S )|κ=κS0 = qS 3cI −

1
cA



and
2
ΠI (xN
I )|κ=κS0 = qI cS

Whereas, if I makes a unilateral offer, κI0 = 1, yielding

ΠS (xN
S )|κ=κI0

=

qS2



1
5
cI −
4
cA



and
2
ΠI (xN
I )|κ=κI0 = qI cS +

qS2 cI
2

The result follows by comparing corresponding cases. 4
PROOF of Proposition 9:

N
N
N
ΠS (xN
S )|κ=κS1 + ΠI (xI )|κ=κS1 < ΠS (xS )|κ=κI1 + ΠI (xI )|κ=κI1

and Notice:


N
2
ΠS (xN
S )|κ=κS0 + ΠI (xI )|κ=κS0 = qS 3cI −
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1
+ qI2 cS
cA


while
N
2
ΠS (xN
S )|κ=κI0 + ΠI (xI )|κ=κI0 = qS



7
1
cI −
+ qI2 cS
4
cA


so that
N
N
N
ΠS (xN
S )|κ=κS0 + ΠI (xI )|κ=κS0 > ΠS (xS )|κ=κI0 + ΠI (xI )|κ=κI0

Finally, we can if cA − 2cS , and S does not offer a deal, I can make an offer where S
has some control, and gets his participation constraint, while I obtains a profit.4
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APPENDIX B
PROOFS OF RESULTS FROM CHAPTER 4

PROOF of Lemma 4: The first order conditions implied by equations (4.1),
and (4.2) are:
eIi
qSi = (1 − τi )
(eSi + eIi )2
and,
eSi
qIi = τi
(eSi + eIi )2
i)
This implies that eIi = eSi qIiq(1−τ
. Using either first order condition, we can get the
Si τi

following equations:


eSi = qIi τi 

2

qSi

τi qSi + (1 − τi )qIi

and

2



qIi

eIi = qSi (1 − τi )
τi qSi + (1 − τi )qIi

These implies the stated results. I obtain the equilibrium levels of success by plugging
these in to the functions pSi (eSi , eIi ), and pI (eSi , eIi ).4
PROOF of Lemma 5: First, we note that

dνi
dτi

= −τi (qIi − qSi ) < 0. Now,

i
qSi νi − dν
q τ
dpSi (e∗Si , e∗Ii )
dτi Si i
=
>0
dτi
νi2

and
i
−qIi νi − dν
q (1 − τi )
dpIi (e∗Si , e∗Ii )
−qIi (1 + τi (1 − τi ) − qIi qSi τi (1 − τi )
dτi Ii
=
=
<0
2
dτi
νi
νi2

4
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Note that the proof for Lemma 7 is similar, and to the proof for these two previous
lemmas, and is therefore ommitted.
PROOF of COROLLARY 8: substituting the equilibrium levels of e∗Si , pSi (e∗Si , e∗Ii ), e∗Ii , pIi (e∗Si ,
from LEMMA 4 into equations (4.1), and (4.2), we get Si ’s payoff from rejecting I’s
offer:








2 

qSi τi 
qSi
r
(e∗Si , e∗Ii ) = 
πSi
qSi − τi qIi τi   
νi
νi
and I’s payoff








2 

qIi (1 − τi ) 
qIi
r
(e∗Si , e∗Ii ) = 
πIi
qIi − (1 − τi )qSi (1 − τi )  
νi
νi
Simplifying these equations gives the result.4
PROOF for COROLLARY 9: Suppose not. Then, (e∗Si , e∗Ii ) = 0. Let Si deviate
r
and choose e∗Si > 0. Then, she receives the full value of qSi while I receives 0 < πIi
. So,

I’s best response is to choose eIi > 0. Similarly, the best response of Si to I choosing
eIi > 0 is to choose eSi > 0. This yields the payoffs from Corollary 8.4
PROOF of Lemma 6:

dπIi
dτ

= −2qSi

dpSi (e∗Si ,e∗Ii )
pIi (e∗Si , e∗Ii )
dτi

< 0, following Lemma

5.4
PROOF of Proposition 10: Suppose I locates in m. It has to be the case that
equation (4.4) holds. Now consider every country j ∈ N with qIj > qIm . Equation
(4.4) implies that:


qIj − qIm

2



2

qSm τm 
qSj τj 
− qSm 
< qSj 
νj
νm

Consider the set J = {j ∈ N |qIj > qIm } We can arrange the elements of J so that
the set {1, ...p} corresponds to the indices of J where the elements of J are arranged
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2



as follows: {qI1 ≤ qI2 ≤ ... ≤ qIp } Let Bj = qSj 

qSj τj 
νj



2

τm 
. Then, we
− qSm  qSm
νm

have:

qI1 − qIm < B1

(B.1)

qI2 − qIm < B2
...
qIP −1 − qIm < BP −1
qIP − qIm < BP

Let Bmax = maxj∈J Bj . Certainly: qIP − qIm < BP < Bmax . Since qI1 − qIm ≤ ... ≤
qIP − qIm < BP ≤ Bmax , and by definition Bmax < qSk for some k ∈ J. The proofs
for Corollaries 9, and 11 are similar. However, we note that


2





2 

q τ
1
q τ
qSm  Sm m  − qSh  Sh h   < 1
qI (φm + φh )
νφm
νφh

by the assumption that ∀i ∈

N, qIi φ2i



> qSi

qSi τi
νφi

2

, which ensures the profitability of

locating in any country i ∈ N . This implies that qI (φm + φh ) > qSm


qI (τm + τh ) > qSh

qSh τh
νφh



qSm τm
νφm

2

, and

2

. For Corollary 11, by definition of τm , the inequality holds

for all i ∈ N .4
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